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The tobacco industry has battled the fires of public opinion since the
1500s,1 but the heat has never been so intense as now. Although no seri-
ous efforts have been made to prohibit the sale of cigarettes and other
tobacco products, public pressure and legislative initiatives aimed at man-
ufacturers and users have reached an all-time high. In 1994 alone, to-
bacco executives were grilled in congressional hearings2 and threatened
with criminal investigation.3 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
made overtures toward regulating tobacco as a drug,4 the Department of
* Associate Professor of Advertising, The University of Texas at Austin; Indiana
University, J.D., 1981; University of Wisconsin, Ph.D., 1988. Dr. Richards is a member of
the Colorado and Indiana Bars. The author would like to thank students in his graduate
Advertising & Law seminar for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
A very early version of this Article was presented at the annual conference of the Ameri-
can Academy of Advertising, in Vancouver, British Columbia, in March 1996.
1. French Ambassador Jean Nicot introduced tobacco to Europeans in 1560. A. LEE
FRITSCHLER, SMOKING AND POLITICS: POLICYMAKING AND THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY
7 (2d ed. 1975). It quickly experienced official condemnation by the King of England, who
called it "[a] Custome loathsome to the eye, hatefull to the Lungs, and in the blacke stink-
ing fume thereof, neerest resembling the horrible Stigian smoak of the pit that is bottome-
less." RUTH BRECHER ET AL., THE CONSUMERS UNION REPORT ON SMOKING AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 123 (1963).
2. Regulations of Tobacco Products (Part 1): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103 Cong., 2d
Sess. 542-628, 640-767, 791-844 (1994) (testimony of tobacco executive); see Steven W.
Colford, Tobacco Chiefs Feel Lash on Hill, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 18, 1994, at 4 (noting
the Committee's hostility toward tobacco company executives).
3. Seven congressional members opposed to tobacco use sought a criminal investiga-
tion into whether tobacco manufacturers, and possibly their advertising and public rela-
tions agencies, trade associations, and lobbyists knowingly deceived Congress and the
public about the negative health consequences of tobacco use. Steven W. Colford, Nico-
tine Fit: Feds Mull Criminal Charges Against Cig Firms, Agencies, ADVERTISING AGE, June
27, 1994, at 1.
4. Steven W. Colford, FDA Could Snuff Out Cig Ads: Federal Agency Takes New
Interest in Regulating Tobacco, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 7, 1994, at 4. Dr. David Kessler,
FDA Commissioner, announced that he was considering regulating tobacco by categorizing
nicotine as a drug. Lauran Neergaard, Nicotine Fit Symptomatic of Kessler Dogma, Critics
Say, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Apr. 23, 1994, at A15. Dr. Kessler suggested that "today's
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Defense banned smoking in its facilities worldwide, and several major
restaurant chains banned smoking in their company-owned restaurants.5
In addition, the State of Minnesota filed suit against cigarette makers for
conspiring to hide information about the dangers and addictive character-
istics of cigarettes, 6 and the State of Maryland banned smoking in virtu-
ally all workplaces. 7  Current pressure to diminish tobacco use is
unprecedented.
Many of those involved in this anti-smoking crusade believe one effec-
tive tactic is to remove or limit tobacco advertising and other marketing
promotions. Although tobacco advertising already was restricted in some
cigarettes may in fact qualify as high-technology nicotine delivery systems," and that if
nicotine were declared a drug, he would be forced to ban most tobacco products. Id. The
following year the FDA did, in fact, declare nicotine to be a drug, and proposed some
initial steps for regulating tobacco products, including limitations on tobacco advertising.
Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Held to be Drug that Must be Regulated, Political Handoff to Clin-
ton from F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1995, at A18. One month later, President Clinton
endorsed the idea of turning jurisdiction over tobacco to the FDA, and proposed specific
regulations on tobacco advertising. Anita Manning, Industry Sue3 Over Teen Smoking Ef-
fort, USA TODAY, Aug. 11-13, 1995 at Al; J. Jennings Moss, President Attacks Teen Use of
Tobacco: Rules Affect Advertising and Sales in Machines, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1995, at
Al; Frank J. Murray, Clinton Faces First Amendment Challenge on Cigarettes, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1995, at Al. Tobacco companies and others immediately filed suit to stop
the regulations. See Manning, supra; Moss, supra; Murray, supra. The FDA's resulting
proposed rule incorporated the President's recommendations. See 60 FED. REG. 41,313
(1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 897) (proposed Aug. 11, 1995).
The final version of the rules was announced on August 23, 1996. Stephen Bar & Martha
M. Hamilton, Curbs Placed On Tobacco Ads, Sales, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, August 24,
1996, at Al. Aside from restricting cigarette sales, the rules would require tobacco ads in
magazines read by significant numbers of teens to be black and white, text-only. 61 Fed.
Reg. 44,396, 44,617 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.32). The same restriction would
apply to all tobacco billboards, none of which could be placed within 1000 feet of schools
or playgrounds. Id. (to be codified at § 897.30). Also, they would prohibit brand name
sponsorship of sporting events, and ban the use of brand names on promotional products
like hats and shirts. Id. at 44,617-18 (to be codified at § 897.34).
5. McDonalds announced that its 1,400 company-owned restaurants would be smoke-
free, as did Taco Bell with its 3,300 company-owned restaurants, and Jack-in-the-Box with
its 758 restaurants. Ronald A. Taylor, Signs of the Times: Under Increasing Pressure to
Quit, Smokers Strike Back to Save Rights, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1994, at A10. Arby's
also banned smoking in its company-owned stores, and Dairy Queen prohibited smoking
in its new franchises. Leah Rickard, Burger Lovers Show Distaste for Smokers, ADVERTIS-
ING AGE, July 4, 1994, at 34.
6. Although tobacco sellers are constantly bombarded by lawsuits, this was the first
suit of its kind. Barry Meier, Minnesota, Blue Cross Sue Cigarette Makers, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Aug. 18, 1994, at A8. Minnesota Attorney General Hubert Humphrey III
explained, "'The bottom line is that they promised in all their advertisements to tell the
truth and they lied .... And the result is thousands of deaths and millions in costs."' Id.
7. Christopher J. Farley, The Butt Stops Here: Threatening to Snuff Out Smoking For
Good, the Crusade Against Tobacco Shifts Into Higher Gear, TIME, Apr. 18, 1994, at 58.
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sports stadiums8 and transit system facilities,9 in 1994 the tobacco indus-
try received a series of successive blows. Though not exhaustive, the fol-
lowing list represents most of the major events affecting tobacco
advertising during that year: the American Medical Association (AMA)
published a study purporting to link cigarette ads to smoking by teen-age
girls 10 and also asked Major League baseball teams to ban tobacco ads in
ballparks;11 a Gallup poll found that sixty-eight percent of Americans
want government to impose greater restrictions on cigarette advertising;12
former Surgeon General Joycelyn Elders called for the "Joe Camel" car-
toon character to be banned from cigarette ads;' 3 the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) concluded its three-year investigation of the infamous Joe
Camel cartoon;14 the National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine
published a report advocating that all tobacco ads be prohibited from
using pictures by the year 2000;15 and the California Supreme Court de-
clared that federal law did not preempt an unfair advertising suit concern-
ing the Joe Camel campaign.16 In 1995, the onslaught continued with, for
8. New Jersey's Meadowlands Sports Complex was the subject of a recent bill to ban
tobacco ads, as were Houston's Astrodome, Seattle's Kingdome, and Boston's Fenway
Park. Randy Diamond, State Senate OKs Cigarette-Ad Ban Bill Aimed at Sports Complex,
THE RECORD, May 24, 1994, at A01.
9. In New York state alone, New York City, Buffalo, and Rochester transit authori-
ties have banned tobacco ads. Laura Rich, Put That Out, INSIDE MEDIA, May 11, 1994, at
53.
10. John P. Pierce et al., Smoking Initiation by Adolescent Girls, 1944 through 1988: An
Association with Targeted Advertising, 271 JAMA 608 (1994). Anti-smoking activists ac-
claimed the AMA study as the first real proof that cigarette advertising causes underage
smoking. Steven W. Colford & Ira Teinowitz, Teen Smoking and Ads Linked: All Tobacco
Advertising Could be at Risk, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 21, 1994, at 1.
11. Ira Teinowitz & Jeff Jensen, Colo. City May Expel Joe Camel, ADVERTISING AGE,
Apr. 11, 1994, at 46.
12. Colford & Teinowitz, supra note 10. The poll was based on a random sample of
602 adults over age 18 in the continental United States. Id. A total ban on cigarette adver-
tising was supported by 53%. Id. at 36.
13. Sandy Grady, Elders' Attack on Joe Camel May Add Smoke to Fire, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Feb. 28, 1994, at A9. Upon releasing a 314 page report on teenage smoking, Dr.
Elders remarked, "I feel we shouldn't advertise something we know to be a poison and a
killer." Id. In particular, she criticized tobacco ads for creating an image that smoking
makes people popular and attractive, noting that "[t]he teen-ager gets an image. Tobacco
gets an addict." Id.
14. FTC Closes Investigation of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, NEws RELEASE
(Fed. Trade Comm'n, Wash., D.C.), June 7, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Federal Trade Commis-
sion]; see also Steven W. Colford & Ira Teinowitz, Joe Camel Gets Reprieve, for Now,
ADVERTISING AGE, June 6, 1994, at 52 (noting that the issue is long from being settled).
15. Steven W. Colford, Fed Report Fuels Blaze over Tobacco, ADVERTISING AGE,
Sept. 19, 1994, at 42. The report also proposed banning the use of all tobacco brand names,
logos, and trademarks in sporting and cultural events, movies and television. Id.
16. Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73, 83 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 577 (1994). Tobacco companies have long argued that part of the Federal Cigarette
1996] 1149
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example, the U.S. Justice Department suing Madison Square Garden for
allowing a Marlboro sign to be positioned where it could be seen on tele-
vision broadcasts. 17 And in a particularly notable move in the summer of
1995, President Clinton decided to pass jurisdiction over tobacco to the
FDA, and recommended, among other things, regulations that would for-
bid brand-name advertising at sporting events and on products such as t-
shirts and hats.18
The visibility of tobacco ads, along with concerns about their impact on
consumption, make them popular targets for critics. 9 In the world of
commercial speech, tobacco advertising bears the earmarks of an endan-
gered species. Given this recent climate, the passage of one or more laws
banning or severely restricting such promotion seems imminent. The suc-
cess of any such law, however, will depend upon whether it withstands
First Amendment scrutiny. While anti-tobacco proponents undoubtedly
believe the laws will withstand such scrutiny, their own actions have cre-
ated a potential obstacle to finding the laws constitutional.
Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994), places advertising and labeling of
cigarette products exclusively under the jurisdiction of the federal government. Accord
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempts state law actions regarding adequacy of
consumer warnings), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633
F. Supp. 1171, 1179 (D. Mass. 1986), rev'd, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding Congress
did not intend to preempt state common law tort actions involving injuries based on inade-
quate cigarette warnings in labeling and advertising), cert. denied sub nom. Liggett Group,
Inc. v. Public Citizen, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F.
Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) (finding federal law on cigarette labeling preempted state
common law action), affid, 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988); see also Francisco Hernandez, Jr.
& Jordan M. Parker, Federal Preemption of State Tort Actions Under the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 1 (1991) (analyzing Congress's intent
regarding preemption of cigarette labeling and advertising).
17. Ira Teinowitz & Jeff Jensen, Gov't Takes Swing at Cig Signs in Sports, ADVERTIS-
ING AGE, Apr. 10, 1995, at 34. The Justice Department (DOJ) claimed this violated the
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act which prohibits tobacco advertising on broadcast
media. Id. A Justice official stated DOJ had begun examining signs in a variety of sports.
Id.
18. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
19. A cynic might contend that politicians turn to this option, rather than banning the
sale of tobacco, because it appeals to voters who generally hold negative attitudes toward
advertising. Commercial advertising, regardless of the product or service being sold, is
criticized as causing countless societal ills. It has been suggested that "[miany of these
allegations exist ... because advertising serves as a convenient scapegoat for those aspects
of our society, such as greed, vanity, competitiveness, and power struggles which are dis-
pleasing and yet so prevalent." Geoffrey P. Lantos, Advertising: Looking Glass or Molder
of the Masses?, 6 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 104, 125 (1987); see also Richard W. Pollay,
The Distorted Mirror: Reflections on the Unintended Consequences of Advertising, 50 J.
MARKETING, Apr. 1986 at 18 (reviewing academic analyses regarding advertising's effect
on society).
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The thesis of this Article is that the tactics anti-smoking advocates use
have included marshalling political allies, including government officials,
in the struggle against tobacco forces. And in so doing, they have made
tobacco advertising into a major political issue, effectively transforming it
into "political speech." The result is that tobacco advertising, thereby,
deserves far greater protection than conventional commercial advertising
receives. To place this analysis in perspective, this Article first discusses
how regulations aimed at tobacco advertising-particularly cigarette ad-
vertising-would fare under the Supreme Court's approach to commer-
cial speech.
I. CIGARETTE ADVERTISING AS "COMMERCIAL" SPEECH
For nearly 200 years commercial advertising was assumed to be outside
the protective sphere of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court made
this same assumption in its 1942 Valentine v. Chrestensen2° decision, the
first Supreme Court case to specifically address that question. Without
benefit of evidence or theory, the Court simply declared that commercial
advertising was "clearly" unprotected speech.21 Over the next few de-
cades, however, the Court's view shifted,2 2 and in 1976 the Court finally
decided that "commercial speech" does fall within our First Amendment
20. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
21. Id. at 54. In what is, by today's standards, an exceptionally brief opinion, the
Court remarked:
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exer-
cise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and
that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege
in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in
these public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.
Id. For a thorough review of that case, see R. H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1977) (noting that the courts now tend to offer First Amendment pro-
tections to advertising).
22. Several years after Valentine, Justice Douglas characterized that decision as "cas-
ual, almost offhand." Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). However, the real shift in the Court's thinking probably began with New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), involving a paid advertisement containing con-
tent indistinguishable from constitutionally protected speech. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-58..
The Court's dilemma over this gray area was resolved by declaring that the ad was not
truly "commercial," but "editorial" in nature. Id. at 266. In Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809 (1975), however, the Court discovered yet another gray area. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 811-
13. That case concerned an admittedly "commercial advertisement" implicating a major
political issue because the ad was for an abortion clinic. Id. at 812. The Court responded
by protecting the ad, basing its decision on the "public interest" in that content. Id. at 822.
By the time of the Bigelow decision, the line between protected speech and unprotected
commercial speech had blurred such that it was becoming very difficult to separate the two
types of speech, and a reversal of Valentine was not unimaginable.
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liberties. 23 Four years later, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission,24 the Court established a four-part test to
determine whether a particular government infringement on such com-
mercial speech was permissible. 25 The Central Hudson test erected a se-
ries of hurdles over which government authorities must pass before a
regulation will be upheld. That test continues to be the Court's litmus for
commercial speech regulations, though it has been subject to some inter-
pretive modification over the years.
The test's first step permits regulation if the speech is misleading or
promotes an illegal activity.26 For most tobacco ads, this step offers no
solace for potential regulators. Tobacco is a legal product, and it is diffi-
cult to deceive consumers about a product with well-known attributes. If
the first step does not support regulation, then the restriction must sur-
vive all three remaining steps to be held constitutional.
By contrast, the second step does not pose a problem for regulators. It
asks whether there is a "substantial governmental interest" that supports
the law.27 For tobacco, that interest is to save many lives and tremendous
health-care costs. Few would argue that this interest is insubstantial.
It is the third step that presents an immense barrier to tobacco ad re-
strictions. The regulation must "directly advance" the government's in-
terest.28 This is a question of causation: whether a ban or restriction of
tobacco advertising will save lives or health-care costs. In other words,
does tobacco advertising cause people to smoke?
23. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762-65 (1976). The Court based its holding, authored by Justice Blackmun, on
what is essentially a utilitarian economic argument:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonethe-
less dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product,
for what reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free
enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made
through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest
that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this
end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. . . . And if it is
indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it
is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system
ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were
thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a
democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not serve that
goal.
Id. at 765 (footnotes omitted).
24. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).






Although numerous studies have examined this question, none have
found a direct causal connection.19 With all of the anti-smoking activists
who seek to regulate tobacco advertising, there is little doubt that many
have tried to find such proof. Indeed, any researcher who discovered sci-
entifically valid evidence of causation would realize instant fame. Even a
recent Surgeon General report admits the existence of uncertainty:
There is no scientifically rigorous study available to the public
that provides a definitive answer to the basic question of
whether advertising and promotion increase the level of tobacco
consumption .... [T]he extent of influence of advertising and
promotion on the level of consumption is unknown and possibly
unknowable .... 30
To the contrary, studies tend to show that peer pressure and family
influence, rather than tobacco advertising, are the primary determinants
of smoking behavior.31 These findings are robust. Studies-experiments
and surveys alike-consistently reach this same conclusion, even when
29. Jef I. Richards, Clearing the Air About Cigarettes: Will Advertisers' Rights Go Up
in Smoke?, 19 PAC. L.J. 1, 44-47 (1987) (citing studies that do not support a causal link
between tobacco advertising and consumption); Michael J. Garrison, Should All Cigarette
Advertising Be Banned? A First Amendment and Public Policy Issue, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 169,
205 (1987) (concluding there is no clear connection between advertising and tobacco con-
sumption); Claude R. Martin, Jr., Pollay's Pertinent and Impertinent Opinions: "Good" Ver-
sus "Bad" Research, 23 J. ADVERTISING 117, 118 (1994) (arguing cigarette advertising has
minimal or no effect on tobacco use and noting lack of evidentiary evidence to the
contrary).
30. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REDUCING THE HEALTH
CONSEOUENCES OF SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 516-17 (1989).
31. "The literature has tended to underscore the role of parental example and influ-
ence for initiation of smoking by young children and adolescents, and the primacy of peer
influences among older youth." Id. at 337. As Chief Executive Officer of R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco, James W. Johnston probably suffers a lack of impartiality, but he cites the results
of a recent Gallup survey that asked smokers why they started smoking. According to
Johnston, "[o]nly 1% cited advertising. The largest reasons the survey specifically cited
were peer pressure (48%) and family influence (15%)." James W. Johnston, For Old Joe:
Free Speech is the Issue, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 27, 1992, at 22. Professor Claude Martin
has drawn similar conclusions:
I did, and do, claim that cigarette advertising has little or no effect on smoking
initiation and usage rates, but rather on brand-switching .... In preparation for
formulating my opinion I reviewed more than 300 studies, most of which were not
tobacco industry supported, which find smoking initiation and usage rates are the
function of three factors: (1) peer pressure, (2) older sibling behavior, and (3)
parental smoking. There is not the same research-based, evidentiary data to link
smoking initiation and usage rates with advertising ....
Martin, supra note 29, at 118; see also Jean J. Boddewyn, Cigarette Advertising Bans and
Smoking: The Flawed Policy Connection, 13 INT'L J. OF ADVERTISING 311, 312 (1994)
(challenging bans on tobacco products as an effective means in reducing tobacco use);
Richards, supra note 29, at 47 (noting studies that show the central role parents, siblings,
and peer groups play in adoption of tobacco use).
1996] 1153
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analyzing smokers of different ages, sex, or ethnic groups.32 Evidence
available at this time simply does not support the notion that regulation of
tobacco advertising will "directly advance" the government's interest in
reducing health costs and mortality. Consequently, unless the Supreme
Court is willing to ignore the available evidence, a total ban or restriction
on ads directed at the general public would be held unconstitutional.
Although earlier proposals sought to abolish all tobacco advertising
and related marketing promotions,33 many recent efforts have had the
narrower agenda of protecting children and other "vulnerable" groups
from tobacco ad effects. The political obstacles to passing a blanket pro-
hibition undoubtedly led to these new tactics. After all, what legislator
could vote against a "protects our children" act?34 While this might be
politically more palatable, and may even increase the government's inter-
est in regulation vis-a-vis Central Hudson's second step, it does not alter
the evidentiary requirement of the third step.35 The evidence still points
to peer and family influence, rather than advertising, as the catalyst for
smoking, regardless of whether the regulation is intended to protect
adults, children, or some other population.
Nonetheless, there are some highly-publicized studies that many peo-
ple may accept as proof that tobacco ads cause children to smoke. These
studies, however, suffer some serious weaknesses. For example, one
highly publicized study found that Joe Camel is as familiar as Mickey
Mouse to six-year-olds. 36 Some anti-smoking advocates, including a re-
32. See, e.g., Lorne D. Bertrand & Thomas J. Abernathy, Predicting Cigarette Smoking
Among Adolescents Using Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Approaches, 63 J. SCH.
HEALTH 98 (1993); Anthony Biglan & Edward Lichtenstein, A Behavior - Analytic Ap-
proach to Smoking Acquisition: Some Recent Findings, 14 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 207,
208 (1984); G.S. Don Morris et al., Prevalence and Sociobehavioral Correlates of Tobacco
Use Among Hispanic Children: The Tobacco Resistance Activity Program, 63 J. SCH.
HEALTH 391 (1993). Even the Director of the National Institute of Child Health and
Human Development admitted that "[tihe most forceful determinants of smoking are par-
ents, peers, and older siblings." Smoking Prevention Education Act: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce on H. R. 1824,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1983).
33. See Health Protection Act of 1986, H.R. 4972, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
34. See Protect our Children from Cigarettes Act of 1989, H.R. 1250, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989).
35. However, this could create other problems. The government is constitutionally
prohibited from reducing "the adult population.., to reading only what is fit for children."
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S.
60, 72-73 (1983) (citing Butler).
36. A survey of 229 children, ages three to six years old, found that the Disney Chan-
nel logo was significantly more recognizable (86.1%) than Joe Camel (30.4%). Paul M.
Fischer et al., Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years, 266 JAMA 3145
(1991). However, by age six there was no statistically significant difference between recog-
nition of the Disney Channel logo (100%) and the Joe Camel logo (91.3%). Id. at 3147.
1154 [Vol. 45:1147
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cent Surgeon General, have cited that research, as proof that children are
being "seduced by glitzy advertising" into becoming smokers.37 That
study-like most highly publicized studies that suggest a link between to-
bacco advertising and tobacco consumption-was conducted by medical
researchers, rather than marketing or advertising researchers.
Anyone with marketing expertise, however, knows there is a big differ-
ence between recognition and consumption behavior. Indeed, consumers
can hate a product and still recognize its ad theme. In a more recent
Roper poll, seventy-three percent of children ages ten to seventeen rec-
ognized Joe Camel, but only three percent of those who recognized the
cartoon figure had a positive attitude toward smoking.3" Indeed, other
cartoon figures like Little Caesar, Ronald McDonald, and the Energizer
Bunny were far more recognized than Joe Camel.39 Consequently, no
study has proven that ads cause children to smoke, even though more
research has been conducted regarding the effects of tobacco advertising
on children than on any other "vulnerable" group.n
Two other articles appeared in that issue of the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, also claiming to provide some evidence that cigarette advertising causes
children to smoke. One study compared high school students to adults, and found 97.7%
of high school students able to identify Joe Camel as compared with 72.2% of adults over
age 21. Joseph R. DiFranza et al., RJR Nabisco's Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel Ciga-
rettes to Children, 266 JAMA 3149 (1991). The study also reported that sales of Camel
cigarettes to children had increased substantially since the cartoon campaign began. Id. A
third study, consisting of 5040 high school students, found that Camel's market share de-
creased substantially with age. John P. Pierce et al., Does Tobacco Advertising Target
Young People to Start Smoking?, 266 JAMA 3154 (1991). These researchers found approx-
imately 22% of girls and 25% of boys who smoked chose Camel over other brands. Id.
These studies received tremendous coverage by the popular press. See, e.g., Jane E.
Brody, Smoking Among Children Is Linked to Cartoon Camel in Advertisements, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1991, at D22.
37. Surgeon General Dr. Antonia Novello wrote that "[a]ccording to recent studies,
Old Joe is now as familiar as Mickey Mouse to American youngsters. As a physician and
as surgeon general, I will not stand by and watch another generation be unknowingly se-
duced by glitzy advertising and big-bucks events." Antonia Novello, Cigarette Ads: A Mat-
ter of Life and Death, USA TODAY, Mar. 25, 1992, at 1IA.
38. Of those teens who were aware of cigarette ads, far more remembered Marlboro
advertising (47%) than remembered Joe Camel (26%). Ira Teinowitz, Joe Camel is No
Tony Tiger to Kids, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 21, 1994, at 36.
39. Unaided awareness of Joe Camel was 73%, while the other characters generated
awareness figures of more than 90%. Patricia Winters, Anti-Smoking Group Rips Pro-Joe
Camel Survey, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 22, 1994, at 44. Elsie the Cow, with 27% aware-
ness, was the only character that was less familiar to these respondents than Joe Camel. Id.
The survey of 1,100 youths, conducted in November 1993, was statistically generalizable.
40. Just as this article was completed, yet another study from a group of medical re-
searchers gained widespread attention by the press. See Nicola Evans et al., Influence of
Tobacco Marketing and Exposure to Smokers on Adolescent Susceptibility to Smoking, 87 J.
NAT'L CANCER INST. 1538 (1995). The media reports claimed that "[tiobacco advertising is
a stronger factor than peer pressure in encouraging children under 18 to smoke, a study
Catholic University Law Review
This lack of causal connection is what led three of five FTC Commis-
sioners to decide against regulating Joe Camel advertising. In a published
statement the Commissioners declared:
Although it may seem intuitive to some that the Joe Camel ad
campaign would lead more children to smoke or lead children to
smoke more, the evidence to support that intuition is not there.
Our responsibility as commissioners is not to make decisions
based on intuition but to evaluate the evidence and determine
whether there is reason to believe that a proposed respondent
violated the law. The Commission has spent a great deal of time
and effort reviewing the difficult factual and legal questions
raised by this case, including a comprehensive review of relevant
studies and statistics. Because the evidence in the record does
not provide reason to believe that the law has been violated, we
cannot issue a complaint.
If intuition and concern for children's health were a sufficient
basis under the law for bringing a case, we have no doubt that a
unanimous Commission would have taken that action long ago.
The dispositive issue here, however, was whether the record
showed a link between the Joe Camel advertising campaign and
increased smoking among children, not whether smoking has an
effect on children or whether the health of children is important.
Indeed, our concern about the health of children led us to con-
sider every possible avenue to a lawsuit before reaching today's
decision.4
released today has found." Philip J. Hilts, Ads Linked To Smoking By Children, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 1995, at B9. However, upon examining the study, one can find numerous
shortcomings. Though far too complex to completely review here, the study's major weak-
nesses include the assumptions researchers make about the validity of two indexes they
create, the assumptions they make about the susceptibility of certain children to smoking,
and the fact that they compare unequal circumstances (i.e., comparing receptivity to ads
with exposure to smokers, which is roughly equivalent to asking children whether actors
they like or neighbors they have seen have more of an influence on them). An editorial in
Advertising Age magazine made the following observation:
[S]upposition was piled on supposition to postulate that cigarette advertising and
promotions are even more important than peer pressure in getting children to
begin smoking.
The study, drawn from a 1993 survey of adolescents, was published long after -
coincidentally, just as President Clinton strives to give the Food & Drug Adminis-
tration power to restrict tobacco advertising. That gives its findings an aura of
advocacy rather than reliability.
The Power of Advertising?, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 6, 1995, at 16.
41. Commissioners Mary L. Azcuenaga, Deborah K. Owen, and Roscoe B. Starek, III,
supported the Commission's decision to take no action against the Camel advertising. Fed-
eral Trade Commission, supra note 14; see Steven W. Colford & Ira Teinowitz, Congress-
man Douses Threat to Joe Camel, ADVERTISING AGE, June 13, 1994, at 8 (discussing
Congress's decision not to challenge the FTC's decision).
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One of the two dissenting Commissioners even admitted that the evi-
dence was only circumstantial."a This same causation obstacle would cre-
ate problems under the third step of the Central Hudson test. Therefore,
a restriction aimed at protecting children, or any other "vulnerable"
group, will fail the Central Hudson test unless more substantial evidence
is found, or unless the Court is willing to accept intuition as adequate
proof of causation.43
This is not to suggest that there is a consensus regarding the sufficiency
of currently existing evidence. Many people feel that there is sufficient
proof to take action. Indeed, there is even significant disagreement
among advertising and marketing experts." The point here is that there
42. Commissioner Dennis A. Yao stated:
I support bringing an administrative complaint against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company. I have reason to believe that its use of a cartoon character, Joe Camel,
as the centerpiece of a cigarette advertising and marketing campaign, has in-
creased the consumption of cigarettes among those least able to understand the
heavy costs involved in smoking: minors under 18. By refusing to bring such a
case, the majority has implicitly downplayed strong circumstantial evidence of an
effect on minors, evidence that I believe warrants full fact-finding in an adminis-
trative trial. There is evidence that the cartoon character has appeal to minors
and that Camel has increased its market share among minors. There is also evi-
dence that the decade and a half decrease in smoking among minors has slowed
down in the time since the Joe Camel campaign began.
Admittedly, the evidence is circumstantial - it is not surprising that it would
be difficult to produce direct evidence that Joe Camel was the decisive factor in
increasing smoking among minors. In my view, however, given the tremendous
potential for the loss of human life, the issues presented in this case are central to
the agency's consumer protection mission. I am most disappointed that the ma-
jority is not willing to bring this matter to trial.
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 14, at 1.
43. In fairness, it should be noted that the Court has found intuition a sufficient basis
for regulation in at least one case. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of
Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986). In Posadas, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court,
accepted as sufficient to meet Central Hudson's third step, the Puerto Rico Legislature's
unsupported belief that gambling casino advertising would result in increased gambling. Id.
at 342-43.
44. Disagreement is most clearly seen in the heated debate that resulted from the 1991
medical researchers' articles discussed above. See supra note 36. Researchers from univer-
sity marketing and advertising programs voiced highly disparate opinions regarding the
validity of those studies and their sufficiency as a basis for public policy measures. See Jean
J. Boddewyn, Where Should Articles on the Link Between Tobacco Advertising and Con-
sumption Be Published?, 22 J. ADVERTISING 105 (1993); Lawrence C. Soley, Smoke-filled
Rooms and Research: A Response to Jean J. Boddewyn's Commentary, 22 J. ADVERTISING
108 (1993).
In discussing these studies, Richard Pollay, an academic who has actively campaigned
against tobacco advertising and who frequently serves as an expert witness testifying
against the tobacco industry, stated that "[t]he more I have learned from my own research
and trial evidence, the more certain I am that cigarette advertising is far from innocuous in
either intent or effect." Richard W. Pollay, Pertinent Research and Impertinent Opinions:
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is no proof of a causal link between cigarette advertising and cigarette
consumption. Those who believe that sufficient evidence exists must
overlook this missing link and draw inferences of ad effects from things
like consumer recognition, as in the Mickey Mouse study,4 5 or from to-
bacco companies' motives, such as their intent to show their products only
in the best possible light46 or to target children.47 Opposing studies that
find no causal connection must, likewise, be overlooked.48
Our Contributions to the Cigarette Advertising Policy Debate, 22 J. ADVERTISING 110, 110
(1993). But Professor Pollay stopped short of claiming that the studies constituted proof of
causation, saying:
While no research may be perfect at creating absolute proof of the causal linkages
between these observations, readers should examine these articles for themselves
to see if their samples and measurements are unreasonable, insufficient to sup-
port the offered conclusions ... or, most critically, clearly inferior to the research
advanced in support of the cigarette industry. I do not find them so.
Id. at 111. Contrast Professor Pollay's opinion in opposition with that of Claude Martin, an
academic who has testified on behalf of tobacco interests. See Martin, supra note 29, at
118.
45. See Fischer et al., supra note 36.
46. See Richard W. Pollay, Filter, Flavor ... Flim-Flam, Too!: Cigarette Advertising
Content and Its Regulation, 8 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 30 (1989); Richard W. Pollay,
Propaganda, Puffing and the Public Interest, 16 PuB. REL. REV. 39, 40-41 (1990). These
and other studies offer evidence that cigarette manufacturers portray healthy people en-
gaged in physical activities to associate pictures of health with smoking, and that they have
used public relations methods to sow seeds of doubt about the dangers of cigarette smok-
ing. Most marketers, of course, tend to show products in their best light and minimize
their deficiencies. Marketers who emphasize their products' weaknesses seldom stay in
business very long.
47. Professor Pollay has compiled significant proof that, despite their denials, tobacco
companies have a long history of marketing practices clearly aimed at recruiting new
smokers. Richard W. Pollay, Targeting Tactics in Selling Smoke: Youthful Aspects of 20th
Century Cigarette Advertising, 3(1) J. OF MARKETING THEORY PRAC. 1 (1995); Richard W.
Pollay & Anne M. Lavack, The Targeting of Youths by Cigarette Marketers: Archival Evi-
dence on Trial, 20 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 266 (1992). While all of this casts serious
doubts on the industry's motives and honesty, it does not provide evidence that these ads
successfully caused children to smoke. Indeed, the reason for targeting children may have
been to ensure that those children who already had started to smoke would become accus-
tomed to smoking the advertiser's brand, given that brand loyalty is probably developed
early in the smoking habit.
48. In addition to the studies that point to peer and family influence as primary deter-
minants of smoking behavior, see supra note 31, there are several other studies that sug-
gest a lack of causal relationship between advertising and tobacco consumption. See, e.g.,
Avery M. Abernethy & Jesse E. Teel, Advertising Regulation's Effect Upon Demand for
Cigarettes, 15 J. ADVERTISING 51 (1986); George R. Franke, U.S. Cigarette Demand, 1961-
1990: Econometric Issues, Evidence, and Implications, 30 J. OF Bus. RES. 33 (1994); Gary
B. Wilcox et al., Cigarette Advertising and Consumption in South Korea, 1988-1992, 13
INT'L J. ADVERTISING 333 (1994); Gary B. Wilcox & Barry Vacker, Cigarette Advertising
and Consumption in the United States: 1961-1990, 11 INT'L J. OF ADVERTISING 269 (1992);
see also M.J. Waterson, ADVERTISING AND CIGARETTE CONSUMPTION (1984); Boddewyn,
supra note 31, at 311; Garrison, supra note 29, at 175-85; Martin, supra note 29, at 118;
Richards, supra note 29, at 43.
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Some commentators feel that causation is an unreasonably difficult
standard to meet,49 but to require anything less would decimate the First
Amendment protections accorded commercial speech, nearly reducing it
to the low level of scrutiny applied to unprotected speech.50 Indeed, a
lesser standard effectively would vitiate the third step of the Central Hud-
son test.
There is no question that causation is a difficult standard to meet. To-
bacco advertising's impact, if any, occurs within a complex environment,
with consumers receiving information from a wide variety of sources such
as friends, family, news, and entertainment. Isolating the effect of adver-
tising from that of multiple sources is a daunting task; even correlational
49. See Vincent Blasi & Henry P. Monaghan, The First Amendment and Cigarette Ad-
vertising, 256 JAMA 502 (1986) (discussing constitutional issues involved in Federal legis-
lation banning promotional advertising for cigarettes). It should be noted that the
American Medical Association hired Blasi and Monaghan to write the article as a counter-
point to the tobacco industry's legal arguments. The Supreme Court has accepted some-
thing less than causation as sufficient proof, in the context of nudity-as-expression, that a
public indecency law advanced a substantial government interest in maintaining societal
disapproval of nudity in public and among strangers. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
U.S. 560, 571-72 (1991) (upholding a law requiring nude dancers to wear panties, in spite of
its effect on the dancers' expressive rights). In his concurrence, Justice Souter admitted
that there was no proof of causation, but that correlation was sufficient:
To say that pernicious secondary effects are associated with nude dancing estab-
lishments is not necessarily to say that such effects result from the persuasive
effect of the expression inherent in nude dancing. It is to say, rather, only that the
effects are correlated with the existence of establishments offering such dancing,
without deciding what the precise causes of the correlation actually are.
Id. at 585-86 (Souter, J., concurring).
50. The Court has explained the minimal protection afforded unprotected speech:
"Although the First Amendment does not apply to categories of unprotected speech, such
as fighting words, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the regulation of unprotected
speech be rationally related to a legitimate government interest." R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 406 (1992) (White, J., concurring). Such regulations need only be ra-
tionally related to the government's interest, rather than directly advancing it. Id. at 407.
If that difference were removed, then the only difference between the standard of scrutiny
for unprotected speech and that applied to commercial speech would be that the former
requires a legitimate government interest while the latter requires a substantial interest.
The Court is clear that commercial speech deserves more than this rationally related ap-
proach. Id. at 422, 427. In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410
(1993), the Court announced that "while we have rejected the 'least-restrictive-means' test
for judging restrictions on commercial speech, so too have we rejected mere rational basis
review." Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 417 n.13.
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evidence5 remains elusive.52 Although the Court never has specified the
precise type or quantity of evidence necessary to prove that a law "di-
rectly advances" a governmental interest, the burden of proof is on the
government and it clearly requires more than "mere speculation or
conjecture. 53
51. A correlation is evidence that two variables occur simultaneously, thereby sug-
gesting some relationship. If a cigarette's sales increase and a cigarette's advertising in-
crease are coterminous, then we generally can conclude that a relationship may exist
between the two. It is not conclusive evidence, but it certainly is persuasive, especially if
the correlation is strong. However, the primary weakness of such evidence is that a corre-
lation does not unearth the nature of that relationship. It may be that the advertising
caused increased sales or, conversely, that increased sales caused a company to invest addi-
tional money in advertising. As Professor Plutchik pointed out several years ago:
[A] correlational study does not imply causation, whereas an experimental one
does. The fact that cigarette smoking is correlated with frequency of lung cancer
does not necessarily mean that it causes it. For example, it may be that people
who smoke the most also live in the larger cities where smog and exhaust fumes
exist in great concentrations, which in turn increase the chances of lung cancer.
Perhaps heavy cigarette smokers have a diet which is different from that of non-
smokers again affecting the probability of illness. Because a large number of hy-
potheses are possible, any correlation does not enable a direct statement of cause.
In a good experiment, it is possible to say that the conditions manipulated by the
experimenter caused the reactions which were obtained.
ROBERT PLUTCHIK, FOUNDATIONS OF EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 29 (2d ed. 1974).
52. In fact, studies that look at the correlation between advertising and sales over time
consistently find little or no relationship between the two. For example, two researchers,
looking at quarterly data from 1961 to 1990, found advertising expenditures had no signifi-
cant relationship with aggregate cigarette consumption in the United States. See Wilcox &
Vacker, supra note 48, at 269. Other researchers conducted several studies with consistent
results covering other time periods and geographic areas. See Lester W. Johnson, Cigarette
Advertising and Public Policy, 7 INT'L J. OF Soc. ECON. 76, 80 (1988) (noting studies in the
United States and in other countries examining the effects of bans on cigarette advertis-
ing). A few studies have found a statistically significant relationship, but even in those
studies the relationship tends to be minimal. See Abernethy & Teel, supra note 48, at 51.
53. "This burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a govern-
mental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that
the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree." Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993). In Ibanez v. Florida Department
of Business & Professional Regulation. 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994), the Court repeated that
standard, stating, "Commercial speech that is not false, deceptive, or misleading can be
restricted, but only if the State shows that the restriction directly and materially advances a
substantial state interest in a manner no more extensive than necessary to serve that inter-
est." Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2088. But, this standard is not new. In considering a ban on an
electric utility's promotional advertising, the Court declared that the "impact of promo-
tional advertising on the equity of appellant's rates is highly speculative.... Such condi-
tional and remote eventualities simply cannot justify silencing appellant's promotional
advertising." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
569 (1980).
During the October 1995 term the Court further clarified the standard. See 44 Li-
quormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996). In 44 Liquormart, the plaintiffs
challenged a local regulation that prohibited advertising the prices of alcoholic beverages,
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There is a large body of evidence that points to peer and family influ-
ence as a causal factor in smoking. If tobacco ads were a major determi-
nant of smoking, it seems logical that a similar body of evidence would
exist to support the allegation that advertising contributes to that habit.
But if the effect is very small, then we may never be able to detect it. The
lack of evidence regarding tobacco advertising's impact on smoking sug-
gests that the effect of such advertising, if any, is de minimus. If the effect
is so small, it is unclear how restrictions on tobacco advertising will "di-
rectly advance" the government's interest in any meaningful way. Per-
haps the most substantial obstacle to finding adequate proof is the
difficulty in finding reasonably objective researchers to conduct research
in this area. 4 Nonetheless, the third step of the Central Hudson test can-
except in one's store, and sought a declaration that the regulation was unconstitutional. Id.
at 1502-03. The defendant argued that the 21st Amendment effectively modifies the third
step of Central Hudson to require only that the regulatory scheme be reasonably related to
the government's interest, thereby reducing the government's burden of proof. Id. at 1503.
The district court disagreed, and remarked that the State had failed to carry its burden of
proof to show a direct "correlation between the price advertising ban and reduced con-
sumption" of alcohol. 44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F. Supp. 543, 555 (1993), rev'd
sub nom. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1994), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1495
(1996). The First Circuit took a different view, determining that whether the government's
interest is directly advanced is not so strict a burden of proof:
The district court held that it was an issue for it to decide, unfettered, between
competing witnesses, and since, on its weighing the evidence, the court was not
persuaded that the State was correct, it failed. We do not think the burden that
strict. It is not correctness, it is reasonableness.
44 Liquormart, 39 F.3d at 7.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the circuit court's holding and ruled that the
advertising ban was unconstitutional. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1501. Writing for the
Court, Justice Stevens denounced the State's lack of evidence to support its allegation that
alcoholic beverage advertising causes alcohol consumption, since:
[A]ny conclusion that elimination of the ban would significantly increase alcohol
consumption would require us to engage in the sort of 'speculation or conjecture'
that is an unacceptable means of demonstrating that a restriction on commercial
speech directly advances the State's asserted interest. Such speculation certainly
does not suffice when the State takes aim at accurate commercial information for
paternalistic ends.
Id. at 1510 (citation omitted).
54. For example, subsequent to publication of the DiFranza study, supra note 36, evi-
dence was unearthed that strongly implicates Dr. DiFranza in predetermining the results of
his study. Claude R. Martin, Jr., Ethical Advertising Research Standards: Three Case Stud-
ies, 23 J. ADVERTISING 17, 26 (1994). Such predetermination violates several principles of
scientific research. Id. It should also be noted that Dr. DiFranza is the vice president of
Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco. See Dr. J. R. DiFranza, Many Ad Restrictions, AD-
VERTISING AGE, Oct. 23, 1995, at 22. The fact that almost all of the research tying tobacco
advertising to smoking behavior comes from medical researchers, rather than researchers
with advertising or marketing expertise, also raises questions of objectivity because the
medical profession has so actively campaigned for regulation of tobacco promotions. It
appears as though some of the research used by anti-smoking advocates may lack objectiv-
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not be overcome without additional evidence, unless the Court either cre-
ates a new loophole in the causation requirement or simply ignores it.
The final step of the Central Hudson test, whether the regulation is
"narrowly tailored" to serve the stated government interest, 55 presents
yet another barrier to a broad-based restriction or ban of cigarette adver-
tising. Unless the Court finds the means to support or circumvent the
third step, however, the fourth step is moot.
If the Central Hudson test is so formidable, why do anti-smoking pro-
ponents believe that a ban or restriction on advertising will survive?
Some, of course, are unfamiliar with the test, but others may believe that
the Supreme Court is prepared to uphold such regulation in spite of the
deficient evidence.
II. SUPREME DISDAIN FOR CIGARETTE ADVERTISING
In general, the Court has shown a relatively low regard for commercial
speech. Although the First Amendment makes no explicit distinction be-
tween one form of speech and another, the Court has created a hierarchy
in the protection afforded different types of speech. As Justice Stevens
explains, "[Plolitical speech occupies the highest, most protected position;
commercial speech and nonobscene, sexually explicit speech are regarded
as a sort of second-class expression; obscenity and fighting words receive
the least protection of all."'56 At least one Justice has evidenced a particu-
lar distaste for advertising: Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has become "the great dissenter" in Supreme
Court decisions that favor First Amendment protection for commercial
speech. He dissented in Bigelow v. Virginia,57 the case that provided the
first hint that the Court might be leaning toward recognizing such protec-
tion of commercial speech.58 Then, he wrote the sole dissent in Virginia
ity. Of course, it is equally probable that some or much of the research used to defend
tobacco advertising is similarly tainted. Indeed, some of the research is funded by the
tobacco industry, and some of the researchers earn significant incomes by testifying for the
industry in lawsuits. Regardless, however, of whether one has a preset agenda, this is a
subject about which it is difficult for anyone, including scientists, to be objective.
55. "What our decisions require is ... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective." Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). The Fox decision repre-
sents a more recent interpretation of the fourth step. The original language of the test
asked whether or not the regulation in question was "more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
56. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992).
57. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
58. This hint can be seen in one of the Court's remarks, where it stated that the "fact
that the particular advertisement in appellant's newspaper had commercial aspects or re-
flected the advertiser's commercial interests did not negate all First Amendment guaran-
tees. The State was not free of constitutional restraint merely because the advertisement
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State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc. ,9
the case which finally endowed commercial speech with First Amend-
ment protection.6 ° In that dissent he revealed disdain for commercial
speech, specifically mentioning cigarette promotions:
The logical consequences of the Court's decision in this case, a
decision which elevates commercial intercourse between a seller
hawking his wares and a buyer seeking to strike a bargain to the
same plane as has been previously reserved for the free market-
place of ideas, are far reaching indeed. Under the Court's opin-
ion the way will be open not only for dissemination of price
information but for active promotion of prescription drugs, li-
quor, cigarettes, and other products the use of which it has pre-
viously been thought desirable to discourage.61
Since that decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist has dissented in most cases
that favored commercial speech in any way,62 and he has consistently
joined the Court's decision where commercial speech was held regul-
able.6 3 In fact, he authored the Court's opinion in Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. ,64 which frequently is noted as the deci-
sion most damaging to commercial speech rights since the Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy decision. 65
involved sales or 'solicitations' . . . or because appellant was paid for printing it .. " Id. at
818.
59. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
60. Id. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. Id. Justice Rehnquist stated further:
Both Congress and state legislatures have by law sharply limited the permissible
dissemination of information about some commodities because of the potential
harm resulting from those commodities, even though they were not thought to be
sufficiently demonstrably harmful to warrant outright prohibition of their sale.
Current prohibitions on television advertising of liquor and cigarettes are promi-
nent in this category, but apparently under the Court's holding so long as the
advertisements are not deceptive they may no longer be prohibited.
Id. at 789 (emphasis added).
62. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); Peel v. Attor-
ney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626
(1985); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350
(1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
63. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Friedman v. Rogers,
440 U.S. 1, 2 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 477 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring).
64. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
65. One observer stated that "Posadas struck at the very foundation of support for
commercial speech within the first amendment." David F. McGowan, Comment, A Criti-
cal Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359, 376 (1990). Another remarked,
"Perhaps the best way to destroy a doctrine is from the inside. Justice Rehnquist did just
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:1147
In Posadas, gambling casinos were forbidden to advertise their facilities
to Puerto Rico residents, even though gambling was legal and ads di-
rected at non-residents were permitted. Then Associate Justice Rehn-
quist purported to apply the Central Hudson test, but did little more than
pay it lip-service.66 The law's stated purpose was to protect citizens from
the crime, corruption, and prostitution that gambling caused. With no
evidence that gambling caused these evils and with no evidence that ad-
vertising caused gambling, Justice Rehnquist stated that the legislature
obviously believed the ads would increase gambling and that "the legisla-
ture's belief [was] a reasonable one."6 7 He likewise glossed over the
test's fourth step, declaring "it is up to the legislature to decide whether
or not" a less restrictive approach would satisfy the legislature's goals.68
In other words, while the test was designed to be a series of barriers to
government action, the Court allowed the government to decide whether
or not it had passed that test.
While that decision ostensibly was based upon the Central Hudson test,
Justice Rehnquist went on to add that because the legislature had the
that in [Posadas]." Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Comment, Commercial Speech After Posadas and
Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep's Clothing, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1931, 1944
(1992). But perhaps no critic of the impact of Posadas put it more pointedly than Professor
Philip B. Kurland:
If the Posadas opinion had done no more than patently to misapply its own
established commercial speech doctrine to what is concededly an idiosyncratic set
of facts, it would simply be another example of the Court's frequently cavalier
treatment of precedents in the service of desire. We have become more or less
acclimated over recent years to these kinds of judicial machinations ...
[H]owever, the Court seemed to create a novel principle that is violative of every
notion of what the Free Speech Clause has stood for, from the limited Black-
stonian notion of "prior restraint" through Mr. Justice Black's "absolutism."
Philip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: "'Twas Strange, 'Twos
Passing Strange; 'Twos Pitiful, 'Twos Wondrous Pitiful," 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 12 (1986)
(footnote omitted).
66. See generally Kurland, supra note 65, at 12. There seems to be a virtual consensus
on this point among legal scholars. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 29, at 194; Barbara M.
Mack, Commercial Speech: A Historical Overview of Its First Amendment Protections and
An Analysis of Its Future Constitutional Safeguards, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 59, 66-67 (1988-89);
Mauro, supra note 65, at 1946-48; McGowan, supra note 65, at 375-76; Richards, supra
note 29, at 24-31; Ronald D. Rotunda, The Constitutional Future of the Bill of Rights: A
Closer Look at Commercial Speech and State Aid to Religiously Affiliated Schools, 65 N.C.
L. REV. 917, 925-26 (1987); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of
the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1182 n.1 (1988). An editorial in an advertis-
ing trade magazine stated, "Although Justice Rehnquist uses the Central Hudson tests in
arriving at this decision, he dispatches them with ease in an opinion so lacking in logic it
must be an embarrassment to the other justices who joined him in the 5-4 opinion." Prohi-
bition Again?, ADVERTISING AGE, July 14, 1986, at 17.
67. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342.
68. Id. at 344.
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power to ban casino gambling, it held the lesser power to ban casino ad-
vertising.69 Again he specifically mentioned cigarettes:
It would just as surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which
would concede to the legislature the authority to totally ban a
product or activity, but deny to the legislature the authority to
forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity
through advertising on behalf of those who would profit from
such increased demand. Legislative regulation of products or
activities deemed harmful, such as cigarettes, alcoholic bever-
ages, and prostitution, has varied from outright prohibition on
the one hand ... to legalization of the product or activity with
restrictions on stimulation of its demand on the other hand
70
Because Justice Rehnquist's Central Hudson analysis already had con-
cluded that the regulation was permissible, his gratuitous mention of a
"lesser power" seemed to make no sense. 71 The Posadas decision was
announced seventeen days before a congressional subcommittee began
hearings on a proposed ban of cigarette advertising.72 It was almost as if
Justice Rehnquist were sending a signal of approval to Congress.
A few years later Justice Scalia, who frequently joins Chief Justice
Rehnquist in decisions, wrote the opinion in Board of Trustees v. Fox. 7 3
That case, too, has been cited as lowering the protection for commercial
speech. The Central Hudson test's fourth step originally required the reg-
ulation to be "no more extensive than necessary. '74 Most observers as-
sumed this interpretation required a regulation to be the least restrictive
alternative. If an alternative law would abridge less speech, the tested
regulation should be rejected. Justice Scalia's decision, however, de-
clared that the regulation need not be the least restrictive, so long as it
69. "In our view, the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily
includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling ...." Id. at 345-46.
70. Id. at 346 (emphasis added).
71. Id. In fact, Justice Rehnquist distinguished this situation from cases involving ad-
vertising for contraceptive devices and abortion services, noting that the distinguishing fac-
tor is that the underlying activities in those two instances are specifically protected under
the Constitution. Id. at 345. This implies that advertising for any product or service the
Constitution does not specifically protect could be banned. Because very few products and
services hold such status, this declaration would permit banning virtually all advertising,
thereby effectively reversing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976) (holding that commercial speech should be
afforded some First Amendment protection).
72. Advertising of Tobacco Products: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 167 (1986).
73. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
74. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1986).
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was narrowly tailored. 75 This appears to allow government more discre-
tion in its choice of regulations, permitting broader restrictions on com-
mercial speech. Like Posadas, the Fox decision signaled anti-tobacco
advertising forces to proceed with more stringent restrictions. 76
Although Posadas and Fox seem to diminish the protections of Central
Hudson, the decision most damaging to the tobacco industry could have
been United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.7 7 In a seven-to-two deci-
sion, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia in the majority, the
Court upheld a law prohibiting advertising for lotteries, except state-run
lotteries within the sponsoring state.78 The Court essentially picked up
the thread Chief Justice Rehnquist left in Posadas, again isolating ciga-
rette ads:
As in Posadas ... the activity underlying the relevant advertis-
ing - gambling - implicates no constitutionally protected
right; rather, it falls into a category of 'vice' activity that could
be, and frequently has been, banned altogether.... Congress
has, for example, altogether banned the broadcast advertising of
cigarettes, even though it could hardly have believed that this
75. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
76. Congressman Mike Synar noted:
Banning, and certainly the intermediate step of restricting, tobacco advertising is
constitutional. The Supreme Court has long distinguished commercial speech
from political speech, with the former afforded less protection.
A case decided by the Supreme Court last summer, SUNY vs. Fox, [sic] is
widely held as easing the burden of proof the government has to show to defend
actions limiting commercial speech.
Mike Synar, Snuff Out Advertising of Smoking Products, USA TODAY, Feb. 23, 1990, at
10A. At least one legal commentator saw this same potential in that case, and argued:
At a time of increasing health awareness, concerns about the effects of tobacco
and liquor advertising on the young, and the multi-billion dollar toll that tobacco
products and alcoholic beverages impose upon American society, it becomes not
only desirable, but imperative that the government secure the right to limit the
damage caused by these products.
With its easing of the burden of proof, Fox gives the legislature the right to take
action. If Congress and the President accept the challenge to stop or limit
Madison Avenue from hustling such harmful wares, Fox will help safeguard these
measures from constitutional attack.
Mark A. Conrad, Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox - The
Dawn of a New Age of Commercial Speech Regulation of Tobacco and Alcohol, 9 CAR-
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 61, 105-06 (1990). It should be noted, however, the author as-
sumes that "[e]nough data exists to establish the link between advertising and smoking" to
directly advance the government's interest. Id. at 96. This requires accepting mere corre-
lational data as sufficient proof of causal connection. It is well known that scientists do not
view correlation as a good indicator of causation. Indeed, there is a correlation between
increases in computer usage and increases in the number of women in the workforce, but it
would be silly to suggest that either has been the cause of the other.
77. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
78. Id. at 436.
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regulation would keep the public wholly ignorant of the availa-
bility of cigarettes.79
Once more, the Court claimed to follow the Central Hudson test. But
the implication is that where a product or service arguably can be called a
vice, the government has the greater power to ban the product, and
therefore has the lesser included power of banning only the ads. In effect,
this would modify the first step of the Central Hudson test to permit regu-
lation of advertising that is (1) misleading, (2) for an illegal product or
service, or (3) for a vice product or service. While the Court did not
explicitly modify the test, there was little doubt that this was the direction
the Court was taking. The signal was clear: cigarettes are vice products,
and thus, cigarette ads can be restricted with impunity.8"
Given the Court's recent trend, along with its low regard for commer-
cial speech and the signals anti-smoking factions have received, it is no
surprise that the fervor to regulate cigarette ads has piqued. However,
the recent 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island8 l decision may thwart their
expectations. That decision could prove to be a watershed commercial
speech case.
In 44 Liquormart, the Court declared unconstitutional a law prohibit-
ing liquor stores from advertising the prices of alcoholic beverages. The
decision, penned by Justice Stevens, appears to narrow the commercial
speech doctrine. It draws a line between laws aimed at preserving a fair
bargaining process, such as restrictions on deceptive claims, and laws that
have purposes unrelated to fair dealing. States, this decision suggests,
have significant leeway in regulating the former, but the latter are subject
to the same high level of scrunity used for fully-protected noncommercial
speech.82 Restrictions on tobacco advertising appear to fall into the latter
category.
79. Id. at 426, 434 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
80. The Court did not bother to define the term "vice." Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S.
at 426. As law enforcement officials use the term vice, gambling surely would be a vice,
but cigarettes would not. On the other hand, the colloquial definition of vice would en-
compass cigarettes and a broad range of other products and activities. Undoubtedly, many
people would consider alcohol to be a vice; still others would even call candy and desserts
vices. The Court's approach conceivably could be so extensible as to include almost any
commercial product or service. For a more thorough treatment of this case, see Tara L.
Lavery, Note, Commercial Speech Suffers A First Amendment Blow in United States v.
Edge Broadcasting Co., 14 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 549, 583 (1994) (concluding that Edge
Broadcasting "left the level of judicial protection accorded commercial speech in a state of
confusion").
81. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
82. The decision states:
When a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from mislead-
ing, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires the disclosure of benefi-
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One statement by the Court may provide some insight into the pros-
pects for proposed tobacco advertising regulations:
Precisely because bans against truthful, nonmisleading commer-
cial speech rarely seek to protect consumers from .either decep-
tion or overreaching, they usually rest solely on the offensive
assumption that the public will respond "irrationally" to the
truth. The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical
of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the
government perceives to be their own good. 83
This seems to represent a notable change in the Court's attitude toward
commercial speech, as compared to Posadas, Fox, and Edge Broadcast-
ing. In fact, the decision went on to virtually decimate Posadas, declaring
that Posadas granted too much deference to the legislature84 and that its
"greater-includes-the-lesser" reasoning was constitutionally indefen-
sible.85 It likewise announced that, contrary to the implication in Edge
Broadcasting, there is no "vice" exception to First Amendment protec-
tion for commercial speech.86
Consequently, the Court's trend toward reducing protections for com-
mercial speech appears to be in retreat, and the barriers to tobacco adver-
tising regulations seem to have suddenly elevated. If such regulations are
judged under the current commercial speech standards, there is a very
real chance that they will be deemed unconstitutional. Through their
cial consumer information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the
reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial speech and there-
fore justifies less than strict review. However, when a State entirely prohibits the
dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unre-
lated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to
depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands.
Id. at 1507.
83. Id. at 1508 (citation omitted).
84. The State argued that it was exercising appropriate legislative judgment in its price
advertising ban. The Court, however, rejected that argument, stating, "Given our long-
standing hostility to commercial speech regulation of this type, Posadas clearly erred in
concluding that it was 'up to the legislature' to choose suppression over a less speech-
restrictive policy." Id. at 1511.
85. The State picked up Justice Rehnquist's Posadas logic, and argued that because it
had the power to ban alcohol sales, it necessarily held the power to take the "lesser" mea-
sure of banning only the advertising. The Court found no merit in that argument, saying,
"Further consideration persuades us that the 'greater-includes-the-lesser' argument should
be rejected for the ... reason that it is inconsistent with both logic and well-settled doc-
trine." Id. at 1512.
86. The Court explained the difficulty in acknowledging such an exception, and added,
"The recognition of such an exception would also have the unfortunate consequence of
either allowing state legislatures to justify censorship by the simple expedient of placing
the 'vice' label on selected lawful activities, or requiring federal courts to establish a fed-
eral common law of vice." Id. at 1513.
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own actions, however, anti-smoking activists may have created yet an-
other barrier to successful regulation of cigarette ads.
III. CIGARETTE ADVERTISING AS POLITICAL SPEECH
Unlike commercial speech, "political" speech is considered to be at the
core of the First Amendment.87 Such speech includes not only discus-
sions of politicians and political campaigns, but also the interchange of
ideas concerning issues of great public interest and concern.8 8 As the
Court remarked in Thornhill v. Alabama:
89
The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Con-
stitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully all matters of public concern without previous re-
straint or fear of subsequent punishment. The exigencies of the
colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom from oppres-
sive administration developed a broadened conception of these
liberties as adequate to supply the public need for information
and education with respect to the significant issues of the
times .... Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic
function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which in-
87. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (asserting
that the 5th and 14th Amendments "share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government"); see also, Board of
Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (referring to political speech as a core protection
of the First Amendment); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (noting that courts have
"consistently commented on the central importance of protecting speech on public is-
sues"); Federal Elections Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
251 (1986) (holding § 316 of the Federal Election Campaign Act unconstitutional as ap-
plied to a nonprofit, nonstock corporation because independent expenditures constitute
expression that is fundamental to First Amendment freedoms); Federal Election Comm'n
v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985) (asserting the
First Amendment "affords the broadest protection" to political expression); Landmark
Communications, Inc., v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (noting that truthful reporting
concerning public officials is always protected under the First Amendment).
88. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59
(1985) ("It is speech on 'matters of public concern' that is 'at the heart of the First Amend-
ment's protection"') (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)); Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (noting that advertisements for contra-
ceptives implies "'substantial individual and societal interests"' in the free flow of commer-
cial information as well as protection from unwarranted state involvement); Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (noting that "the Court has frequently reaffirmed that
speech on public issues occupies the "'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values"' and is entitled to special protection.") (quoting NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (according
First Amendment protection for an advertisement that communicated factual material of
public interest); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting that the
First Amendment reflects a "profound national commitment" to protecting debate on pub-
lic issues).
89. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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formation is needed or appropriate to enable the members of
society to cope with the exigencies of their period.9°
The focus on public concerns is central to much of First Amendment
jurisprudence. For example, the justification for subjecting broadcast me-
dia to regulations that would be flagrantly unconstitutional if applied to
newspapers or magazines is, at least in part, "to secure the public's First
Amendment interest in receiving a balanced presentation of views on di-
verse matters of public concern."91
Even before advertising was deemed to fall within the First Amend-
ment's sphere of influence, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan9 2 the Court
construed the Constitution to protect an ad that addressed issues of pub-
lic concern. 93 When a full-page ad protesting alleged civil rights abuses
ran in the New York Times, the Supreme Court refused to exempt the ad
from First Amendment coverage merely because it was a paid advertise-
ment.94 Distinguishing this ad from the unprotected variety, the Court
labeled the ad an editorial advertisement, rather than a commercial ad,
because it "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited griev-
ances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf
of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest
public interest and concern., 95 Because the case was decided in 1964, at
the height of a national civil rights movement, the content of the ad impli-
cated matters of public interest and consequence.
A few years later, yet another ad involving a matter of public concern,
abortion, appeared before the Court in Bigelow v. Virginia.96 Unlike
New York Times, this ad was clearly commercial, and at that time com-
mercial speech remained entirely outside the meaning of "speech" within
the First Amendment. Nonetheless, the presence of this issue of public
concern allowed the Court to require constitutional recognition. The
Court found that the "advertisement published in appellant's newspaper
90. Id. at 101-02. This primacy is not limited to issues of political import, as the Court
made clear in that opinion:
The safeguarding of these rights to the ends that men may speak as they think on
matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be exposed through the processes
of education and discussion is essential to free government. Those who won our
independence had confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning and
communication of ideas to discover and spread political and economic truth.
Id. at 95 (emphasis added).
91. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984).
92. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
93. Id. at 265-66.
94. Id. at 266.
95. Id.
96. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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did more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It contained fac-
tual material of clear 'public interest.'
' 97
Thus, even speech that normally would be unprotected has been ac-
corded full refuge under the First Amendment when it addressed a topic
of great public interest. This does not mean that simply by including ref-
erences to public issues, one can elevate lesser speech to "core" speech
status.98 Nonetheless, where the primary subject matter is of significant
public interest, the Court repeatedly has made it clear that such speech
merits the highest level of First Amendment protection.
It is the issue, and not the message, that must be important to the pub-
lic. In fact, it is not necessary that anyone want to hear the message,
because "a function of free speech ... is to invite dispute. It may indeed
best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to an-
ger."99 The message is protected even where it is offensive or disagreea-
ble to a large segment of society 00
Although many people find tobacco use and tobacco advertising offen-
sive, there are few issues today that are more political or of greater public
concern. Because both the subject matter of the advertising and the ad-
vertising itself are matters of public concern, this certainly is not a case of
simply including references to public issues. Tobacco use and advertising
have garnered some degree of public concern for many years, but over
the past decade this concern has piqued, largely because political officials
have set that agenda.
97. Id. at 822. The Court also remarked:
Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of potential inter-
est and value to a diverse audience - not only to readers possibly in need of the
services offered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine inter-
est in, the subject matter or the law of another State and its development, and to
readers seeking reform in Virginia.
Id.
98. See generally Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (reiterat-
ing that advertising that "'links a product to a current public debate' is not thereby entitled
to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech") (citations omitted); Big-
elow, 421 U.S. at 819 (noting that Chrestensen disallowed the distribution of commercial
handbills that asserted a message of public interest on their reverse side merely to evade
the ordinance prohibiting the distribution of commercial handbills on the streets); Valen-
tine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942) (upholding city ordinance prohibiting the
distribution of handbills concerning purely commercial business advertising).
99. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
100. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle under-
lying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.").
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A. Politics and Tobacco
Marketing professor Joel Dubow of St. Joseph's University recently
commented that the FTC investigation of Joe Camel is "as much a polit-
ical issue as a scientific issue and this will bring it into the political
arena."' 1 There is little question that tobacco advertising already is in
the political arena. Numerous officials in the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton
administrations have campaigned to ban or restrict it. Indeed, the current
wave of activism against cigarette ads began in December 1985 when then
U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop recommended that cigarette ad-
vertising be banned."°
In recent years Dr. Koop's successors, Antonia Novello °3 and Joycelyn
Elders,104 have continued Dr. Koop's activism. Stepping well outside the
traditional Surgeon General role, Dr. Novello even encouraged
magazines to reject Camel ads." 5 In 1990, Health and Human Services
(HHS) Secretary Louis Sullivan urged athletes to boycott events that to-
bacco companies sponsored." 6 Likewise, the Centers for Disease Con-
trol (CDC) also joined the crusade."0 7 In 1993, the Clinton
101. Stella M. Eisele, Trade Commission May Smoke Camel's Old Joe, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Aug. 14, 1993, at C1.
102. Surgeon General Calls Smoking an Addiction, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1985, at B10.
Over the years, Surgeon General Koop became even more vociferous in his efforts to curb
tobacco advertising. See Irvin Molotsky, Surgeon General Rebukes Tobacco Industry Over
Combative Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1989, at A16 (quoting the Surgeon General's attitude
toward tobacco advertisements as "enough is enough!"). Toward the end of his tenure Dr.
Koop expanded this effort to include restrictions on alcoholic beverage advertising. James
Cox, Industry Could Face Big Changes, USA TODAY, May 31, 1989, at 1B-2B.
103. Like her predecessor, Novello was quite vocal in her condemnation of tobacco ads,
especially Joe Camel. See Novello, supra note 37, at 11A; Joanne Lipman, Surgeon Gen-
eral Says It's High Time Joe Camel Quit, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1992 at B1. Just one exam-
ple of her public campaign was her participation in a Chicago march protesting the cartoon
character. Paul A. Driscoll, Surgeon General Marches to Protest Cigarette-smoking Joe
Camel Cartoon, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, June 22, 1992, at A5.
104. See supra note 13. In 1994, Elders issued a new Surgeon General's report on
smoking that encouraged the FTC to prohibit use of Joe Camel in cigarette advertising.
Christopher Connell, Elders Accuses Tobacco Companies of Targeting Teens to Keep Sales
Up, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 25, 1994, at A4.
105. Joanne Lipman, Surgeon General Hasn't Slowed Joe Camel, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14,
1992. at BI1.
106. Charles Green, Boycott Tobacco-Sponsored Events, Sullivan Urges Athletes, Aus-
TIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 24, 1990, at A10. Sullivan argued, "'This blood money should
not be used to foster a misleading impression that smoking is compatible with good
health."' Id. He asked tobacco companies to stop sponsoring these events and encouraged
athletic organizations to refuse such support. Id.
107. Advertising Has CDC Smoking, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 27, 1990, at A9. Based
upon a study that found tobacco companies spent $3.27 billion in 1988 to promote ciga-
rettes, officials at the CDC stated that cigarette advertising diminishes the effectiveness of
government health warnings. Id. The study stated that the ads "'may contribute to the
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administration endorsed an anti-tobacco bill that would ban several pro-
motional efforts of tobacco companies. 108 In 1994, Attorney General Ja-
net Reno announced she was investigating the advertising and public
relations efforts of tobacco advertisers. 109 Then, in 1995, the Justice De-
partment threatened to file suit against Philip Morris, 110 contending that
the company's cigarette ads were placed in baseball, basketball, football,
and hockey stadiums and arenas in violation of the twenty-four-year-old
ban on broadcast advertising for those products.11'
Of course, the federal government did not focus solely on the tobacco
companies' promotional efforts. The underlying activity-tobacco use-
was under constant bombardment, and the federal officials mentioned
above also aggressively attacked cigarettes and smoking. Bolstering such
efforts to diminish tobacco use, the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (OSHA) proposed to ban nearly all smoking in the work-
place, 1 2 and the Department of Defense banned smoking in all military
workplaces.1 3 Each of these federal officials, agencies, and departments
has played a role in limiting the freedom of smokers and has actively
advanced the popularity of anti-smoking attitudes.
Two federal initiatives are particularly illustrative of the political un-
derpinnings involved in these actions. The first, which involved the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA), provided what is perhaps the
Clinton administration's most influential catalyst of public anti-smoking
perception that smoking is less hazardous, more prevalent and more socially acceptable
than it is."' Id.
108. Steven W. Colford, Clinton Supports Anti-Tobacco Bill, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov.
29, 1993, at 4. The bill would have prohibited product placement in films, and tobacco ads
in video and audio tapes, in video games, and in sports stadiums within 2,000 feet of ele-
mentary or junior high schools. Id. It would also have banned sponsorship of athletic,
musical, and artistic events without federal government approval. Id. In addition, the bill
would have introduced nine rotating health warnings, including one stating, "Cigarettes
can kill you." Id. See generally H.R. 3614, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
109. See supra note 3, and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 17. The Justice Department later filed a civil complaint against
Philip Morris simultaneously with a consent agreement whereby the tobacco maker prom-
ised to remove all signs that could be seen regularly on televised football, basketball, base-
ball, or hockey games. Ted Kulfan, Marlboro Is Ordered to Butt Out, DETROIT NEWS, June
7, 1995, at B1; Neil A. Lewis, Philip Morris Agrees to Keep Ads at Ball Parks off TV, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 1995, at D3.
111. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 89,
as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-109, § 3, 87 Stat. 352 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1335 (1994)). The Act states "After January 1, 1971, it shall be unlawful to advertise
cigarettes and little cigars on any medium of electronic communication subject to the juris-
diction of the Federal Communications Commission." Id.
112. See Farley, supra note 7, at 58.
113. Richard Tomkins, In US, 'No Smoking' Is the Sign of the Times, IRISH TIMES, May
2, 1994, at 12 (discussing the increase in U.S. restrictions on where Americans can smoke).
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sentiments. That catalyst was an EPA report that ostensibly proved envi-
ronmental tobacco smoke (ETS), so-called "secondhand smoke," causes
an estimated 3,000 lung cancer deaths each year.1 14
Politics featured prominently in the controversy surrounding the EPA
report. Tobacco companies, as well as some independent scientists, at-
tacked the report as being fundamentally flawed.' 15 Further, alleging
misrepresentation of the data, tobacco sellers filed suit against the
EPA. 16 One medical researcher even argued publicly that the EPA
manipulated inconclusive statistical data to support a political crusade
against smoking."1 7 A cover story in the National Review claimed the
Agency played fast-and-loose with the data to promote a political agenda:
114. OFFICE OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CAN-
CER AND OTHER DISORDERS, Pub. No. EPA/600/6-90/006F (Dec. 1992). The release of this
report was widely covered in the popular press worldwide. See Farley, supra note 7, at 58;
Tomkins, supra note 113, at 12. The report clearly had some impact on the anti-smoking
trend. For example, when Arby's and Dairy Queen converted to a no-smoking policy in
their restaurants, they both pointed to the EPA's determination of ETS as harmful as a
basis for their new policies. Rickard, supra note 5, at 34.
115. Jonathan Bor, Debate Continues over EPA's Report on the Effects of Secondhand
Smoke, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 4, 1994, at 20C (noting the tobacco industry's criticism of
the EPA report); Sheryl Stolberg, Researchers Try to Separate Smoking Fact from Fiction,
L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1994, at Al, A28 (noting the tobacco industry's criticism of the EPA
study as flawed with the industry contending people tend to overestimate the amount of
their smoke exposure); Anastasia Toufexis, A Health Debate That Won't Die, TIME, Apr.
18, 1994, at 61 (noting that those in the tobacco industry challenged the study as being
fundamentally flawed).
As California attorney John C. Fox points out:
EPA simply ignored the available data on workplace exposure to ETS, all of
which were contained in the very same studies to spousal smoking it did consider.
Of fourteen studies with workplace data, twelve report no statistically significant
overall lung cancer risk to nonsmokers from exposure to ETS. Even the data
considered by EPA fail[s] to support the Group A classification of ETS .... Of
the eleven studies from the United States considered by EPA, not a single one
reported a statistically significant overall increased lung cancer risk. EPA also
refused to consider data from two major ETS epidemiological studies published
in 1992 that are inconsistent with EPA's conclusions about ETS and lung
cancer ....
EPA's use of a relaxed standard for statistical evaluation has triggered further
criticism of its risk assessment on ETS. EPA failed to follow accepted scientific
methods and its own procedural guidelines in reaching its conclusion about ETS
and lung cancer.
John C. Fox, An Assessment of the Current Legal Climate Concerning Smoking in the
Workplace, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 591, 629 (1994).
116. Derrick Z. Jackson, If You Can't Stand the Smoke ... , BOSTON GLOBE, June 27,
1993, at 73; Michael Janofsky, Tobacco Groups Sue to Void Rule on Danger in Secondhand
Smoke, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1993, at Al.
117. Dr. Gary Huber, professor of medicine at the University of Texas, claims to sup-
port bans on public smoking, but is concerned that science has been corrupted to support
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Most supporters of such measures probably believe that the
EPA's report presents definitive scientific evidence that 'second-
hand smoke kills.' But a closer look shows that the EPA
manipulated data and finessed important points to arrive at a
predetermined conclusion. The agency compromised science to
support the political crusade against smoking ....
Even after the EPA massaged the data, the vast majority of
the studies still did not show a significant association between
ETS and lung cancer ....
If your main goal is improving 'the public health,' you may be
inclined to shade the truth a bit if it helps to make smoking less
acceptable and more inconvenient.'
The EPA report also sparked a bonfire of newspaper editorials condemn-
ing the Agency's methods. 19 In spite of this dispute, a recent survey
this political cause. He argues that secondhand smoke is "'so highly diluted that it is not
even appropriate to call it smoke."' Dick Stanley, Texas Professor Questions Secondhand
Smoke Claims, AUSTIN AM-STATESMAN, July 18, 1994, at Al. He notes that, of 30 statisti-
cal studies on the relationship between secondhand smoke and lung cancer, "'six reported
a statistically significant association . . .and 24 . . . reported no statistically significant
effect,"' but the EPA report concluded nonetheless that 24 of the studies found an in-
creased risk of cancer. Id.
Upon hearing of Huber's remarks another researcher, Alvan Feinstein of Yale Univer-
sity, admitted that, "'Yes, it's rotten science, but it's in a worthy cause. It will help us to get
rid of cigarettes and to become a smoke-free society."' Dave Shiflett, Odor of Rotten Sci-
ence Fills the Air, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Mar. 28, 1994, at 37A. Other allegations
include that, while 32 published studies of the effect of ETS on non-smoking spouses ex-
isted at the time of the EPA analysis, the agency nevertheless ignored all of those studies
conducted outside the United States. Further, though none of the remaining 13 studies
demonstrated a significant relationship between spousal smoking and lung cancer in non-
smokers, the agency was able to side-step that problem by dismissing two of the studies
(leaving only 11 of the original 32 studies for the EPA to consider), expanding the defini-
tion of what constitutes a health risk, and then re-analyzing the results. Id. Science writer
Michael Fumento commented that the "11 studies together actually reflected 10 studies
that showed no statistically significant increases in cancer and only one that did. When the
EPA says that the weight of 11 studies showed harm from passive smoking, it really meant
one positive combined with 10 neutrals." Id.
118. Jacob Sullum, Just How Bad Is Secondhand Smoke?, NAT'L REV., May 16,1994, at
51-52, 54 (emphasis added). A couple of years ago marketing professor, Jean Boddewyn,
discussing tobacco advertising research, observed, "[wle should not be surprised that sci-
ence becomes politicized when major issues, such as health, and 'the establishment' that
champion and administer the resulting policies are at stake." Boddewyn, supra note 44, at
107.
119. An editorial in THE WASHINGTON TIMES stated that "[oinly by giving more weight
to studies that link ETS to lung cancer than to those that do not has EPA been able to
portray it as the aforementioned serious public health impact." Politically Correct Health
Risks, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1994, at A20. Another editorial declared: "Some of the
world's most barbarous acts, from slavery to genocide, have been facilitated by bogus sci-
ence. The Food and Drug Administration's Dr. David Kessler, along with Rep. Henry
Waxman and Environmental Protection Agency head Carol Browner, are modern-day
leaders of that ugly scheme." Walter Williams, Bogus Science Breeding Ground for Totali-
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found that approximately eight out of ten Americans believe secondhand
smoke is a health risk.12° Thus, it appears that the EPA may be winning
in the court of public opinion.
The second instance of visible political involvement entailed the FDA.
In 1994, FDA Commissioner David Kessler tried to secure jurisdiction
over tobacco so that the Agency might regulate tobacco and its ads."' 1
Later, in mid-1995, the Agency formally concluded that nicotine was a
drug, and that it should be regulated.122 Rather than push forward with
regulatory plans, however, the Agency passed the ultimate decision re-
garding tobacco regulation to the President. One news report attributed
the Agency's decision to politics:
But in a sign of the delicacy of the issue - and of the opposition
in the Republican Congress to new restraints on smoking - the
agency is not using the authority it has to act on its own. In-
stead, it has thrown the issue to the President, by submitting
proposed regulations to the White House. The proposals them-
selves are modest, involving only new limits on tobacco advertis-
ing and measures to curtail sales to young people.123
tarianism, STATE J.-REG., Nov. 3, 1994, at 6. One scientist stated bluntly that the -EPA
practiced every known trick in the bad-science book to bend, sort and prostitute data to
arrive at an erroneous conclusion that secondhand smoke is a class A carcinogen." Paul E.
Grindrod, EPA Twisted Data in Secondhand Smoke Report, CAPITAL TIMES, Aug. 11, 1994,
at 12A; see also Robert Scheer, EPA Blows Smoke on Risk of Breathing It, L.A. TIMES,
May 29, 1994, at M5 (criticizing ETS linking secondhand smoke to lung cancer). Some
observers have pointed to the EPA report as an additional example of government misus-
ing science to support a variety of political objectives, from environmental protection on
the left to abortion prevention on the right:
Most Americans, including many smokers, no doubt agree that public policy
should, within reasonable limits, discourage the use of tobacco. After all, it is
widely accepted that cigarette smoking in particular is the single greatest cause of
premature disease and death in the United States.
Most Americans, however, just as surely would condemn the distortion of sci-
entific data to advance the anti-tobacco movement, or any other political objec-
tive. But that is exactly what the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has
done.... [O]bjective analysis of the data isn't keeping the EPA and its congres-
sional allies from pushing their overkill war on secondhand smoke....
The misuse or politicization of science is becoming almost commonplace as jus-
tification for extending government regulation, especially on environmental and
health issues. A series of articles last year in The New York Times chronicled a
long list of the resulting excesses.
Robert J. Caldwell, Lost in the Smoke Screen: Bad Science Makes Bad Law, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., May 22, 1994, at G-4.
120. ABC News conducted the poll. John Brennan, Polls Find U.S. Is Unwilling to
Force Tobacco's Last Gasp, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1994, at A5.
121. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
122. Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Held to Be Drug That Must Be Regulated, N.Y. TIMES, July




The reluctance of FDA officials to proceed with Kessler's earlier effort,
along with the "modesty" of the proposals, are clear signals that tobacco
is a political "hot potato." The division of opinion on this issue seems to
fall roughly along party lines.124 This division is obvious from the enor-
mous sums of money that tobacco companies have contributed to Repub-
lican campaign coffers. 125 At least one Democrat, Senator Wendell Ford
of Kentucky, assailed Kessler as a "'headline-grabbing extremist,"' and
charged that "'Kessler's latest move has nothing to do with children and
everything to do with expanding FDA's reach into the private lives of
Americans. ' "126
A short time later, predicting that President Clinton would condone
FDA jurisdiction over tobacco, as Kessler had requested, a news story in
Newsweek concluded that "it could be a boon for Clinton. Democratic
consultants have argued that a hard line against an unpopular industry
may be even more beneficial than his recent attacks on the NRA.' 27
Two weeks later, after the President did as predicted, the same magazine
noted:
Clinton believes that a war against tobacco will be a political
winner - not just in his family but in millions of households....
As a political venture, Clinton's move won't be hazardous to his
health. Anti-smoking sentiment is now squarely in the cultural
mainstream.... And aides know bashing tobacco will play well
in health-conscious, vote-rich California .... In the end, the ad-
ministration can gain points for picking a fight with an unpopu-
lar industry, but it may not do much to stop kids from
smoking. 128
It appeared as though jurisdiction over tobacco promotions had been
moved from the FTC to the FDA simply because the latter seemed more
124. The American Bar Association recognized the division in a recent article in its
main publication, stating, "With Republicans controlling Congress, an onslaught of federal
legislation and regulation aimed at cigarette smoking appears unlikely, at least for now."
James Podgers, Where There's Smoke, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 50. Reacting to this appar-
ent division along party lines, 42 Republican scientists and doctors joined in writing a letter
urging House Speaker Newt Gingrich to "'[d]isassociate yourself, and encourage your fel-
low Republicans to disassociate themselves, from the tobacco industry."' Mike Feinsilber,
GOP Stance Piques Anti-smokers, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 23, 1995, at A8.
125. Jane Fritsch, Tobacco Companies Pump Cash into Republican Party's Coffers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1995, at Al. In the first half of 1995, the tobacco industry invested five
times as much in the Republican Party as the industry did in the same period during 1994.
Id.
126. Doug Levy, Hot Debate Over Regulating Teen Smoking, USA TODAY, July 14,
1995, at 10D.
127. John Leland et al., A Whiff of Smoking Guns, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1995, at 66, 67.
128. Bob Cohn & Bill Turque, Firing Up the Politics of Teen Smoking, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 21, 1995, at 25-26.
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willing to regulate those marketing efforts without regard to whether they
actually cause people to smoke. 129 Congressman Scotty Baesler, a Dem-
ocrat from Kentucky, responded to the President's proposal, stating,
"This is the most political thing I have ever seen.' 130 Like the EPA's
report, politics seem to be at the root of executive and administrative
maneuvering that would draw tobacco within the FDA's sphere of
influence.
But members of Congress too, have campaigned actively against to-
bacco ads. In 1986 Congressman Mike Synar introduced a bill to ban
tobacco promotions,'131 and bills to regulate tobacco ads have been intro-
duced every year since then. The bills range in scope, and include meas-
ures to ban all forms of tobacco advertising;1 32 prohibit the use of certain
media or forums to promote tobacco; 133 restrict certain elements of the
ads, such as pictures and color;134 withdraw tax deductibility of tobacco
promotions; 135 add warning labels about the addictive nature of smok-
ing;' 3 6 amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to allow for the
129. The FTC recently had found insufficient evidence to support regulation of Camel's
advertising. See supra note 41. Kessler, however, campaigned aggressively for jurisdiction
over this material with the implicit promise to regulate it. The FDA has a tradition of
being more willing than the FTC to restrict information to consumers. As marketing pro-
fessor Howard Beales explained in the context of food advertising, "Rather than attempt-
ing to dictate market outcomes, the FTC has sought to ensure that the information
provided by advertising and other forms of marketing communication is accurate and not
misleading," while by contrast, "[r]ather than simply providing information and allowing
consumers to choose, the FDA's regulatory approach seeks to restrict the availability of
information on food that the regulators believe consumers should choose." J. Howard
Beales, Regulatory Consistency and Common Sense: FTC Policy Toward Food Advertising
Under Revised Labeling Regulations, 14 J. PUBLIC POLICY & MKTG. 154, 155 (1995).
130. Ira Teinowitz & Keith J. Kelly, Tobacco Plan Sparks Action by Legislators, AD-
VERTISING AGE, Aug. 21, 1995, at 3, 6.
131. See H.R. 4972, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
132. See id.
133. See H.R. 3614, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
134. See, e.g., H.R. 5041, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990); H.R. 1493, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989); H.R. 1250, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
135. See, e.g., H.R. 2534, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 1969, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); H.R. 1230, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 5499, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S.
557, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 440, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 776, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 412, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 3503, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987); see also S. 609, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (limiting tax deductions for ex-
penses relating to advertising).
136. H.R. 2147, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 1966, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S.
556, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 777, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 2402, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1988); H.R. 4793, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. (1988).
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regulation of tobacco advertising;137 and require the FTC to conduct
studies of tobacco ads. 138
In addition to tobacco advertising, bills have been aimed at tobacco
use. For example, current law permits the federal government to with-
hold substance abuse prevention funds from states that fail to prohibit
tobacco sales to minors.139 Similarly, a recent bill would ban smoking in
buildings visited regularly by ten or more people each week. 140 As one
news story exclaimed, "President Clinton and a growing congressional
contingent have declared all-out war on tobacco.1 41
This war is not limited to federal actions, however. At least forty-six
states and five hundred local governments have placed restrictions on
smoking in malls, restaurants, workplaces, and other public places. 142
The New Jersey State Senate, for instance, recently approved legislation
banning cigarette ads in the Meadowlands Sports Complex. 143 Similarly,
former New York Governor Mario Cuomo proposed a bill to eliminate
outdoor tobacco advertising.1 44 Bills also have been introduced in Cali-
fornia and Vermont to stop displays of Joe Camel,145 and a city official in
Allentown, Pennsylvania, asked the town's daily newspaper to refuse cig-
arette ads.146 Maryland adopted statewide restrictions that ban smoking
in virtually all workplaces, 4 7 and, in California, local governments passed
approximately two hundred anti-smoking ordinances between 1992 and
1994.148
137. S. 672, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 2298, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R.
4350, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R. 1494, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 769, 101st
Cong. 1st Sess. (1989).
138. H.R. 4279, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). The focus of this bill is to determine the
nature and effects of ads targeted at women and minorities.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26 (1994).
140. H.R. 3434, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993).
141. Wayne Hearn & Laurie Jones, Kicking Butts: Anti-Smoking Troops Relish Victo-
ries, but the War Isn't Over Yet, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 25, 1994, at 3.
142. Id. In fact, in 1970, only 14 states had laws restricting smoking in public places, but
by 1993, that number had risen to 45. Peter D. Jacobson et al., The Politics of Antismoking
Legislation, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y. & L. 787, 788 (1993). As recently as 1985, only
about 90 local communities had such restrictions, but within five years that number ex-
ceeded 480. Id.
143. Diamond, supra note 8, at A01.
144. Riccardo A. Davis, Cuomo Seeks Cig Ad Ban, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 19, 1993,
at 4.
145. See Teinowitz & Jensen, supra note 11, at 46.
146. Patrick Reilly, Ad Bans Go Local: City Official Asks Paper to Drop Tobacco, AD.
VERTISING AGE, Jan. 9, 1989, at 42.
147. See Farley, supra note 7, at 58.
148. Linda Himelstein et al., Tobacco: Does It Have a Future?, Bus. WK., July 4, 1994,
at 28.
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Even the courts have become a part of this fray. In 1994, the California
Supreme Court announced that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Ad-
vertising Act does not preempt states from regulating Joe Camel advertis-
ing,149 and the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that local governments
have the authority to ban cigarette vending machines. 5 ( In 1995, the
Second Circuit permitted a suit seeking a ban in two fast-food chains to
proceed under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 5 ' and the Florida
Supreme Court declared that a city policy against hiring smokers does not
invade job applicants' privacy rights.'52 In each of these cases the courts
are breaking new ground, allowing suits or regulations where none previ-
ously had been permitted, all in the name of curtailing tobacco use.
This list represents only a portion of the government actions being
taken to eliminate or restrict tobacco use and advertising. A recent arti-
cle in the Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, entitled "The Politics
of Antismoking Legislation," details some of the political maneuvering
that has occurred outside of the public spotlight. 5 3 In light of all these
facts, any argument that tobacco advertising and tobacco are not political
issues strains credibility. It is probably safe to conclude that there are few
other issues that have so dominated the attentions of federal, state, and
local officials, and have generated so much interest and controversy
among the citizenry in the 1990s.
B. A Public Controversy
One agency of the federal government already has declared smoking a
public controversy. In 1967, responding to a filed complaint, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) ordered in accordance with its
"Fairness Doctrine," a broadcast station airing cigarette ads should allot
free time to the anti-smoking viewpoint.' 54 The FCC premised its finding
explicitly on the public interest and controversy concerning tobacco use.
The Commission believed that "a station which presents such advertise-
ments has the duty of informing its audience of the other side of this
controversial issue of public importance - that, however enjoyable, such
149. Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73, 78 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 577 (1994).
150. C.I.C. Corp. v. Township of E. Brunswick, 638 A.2d 812 (N.J. 1994) (affirming
lower court's finding).
151. Staron v. McDonald's Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 357-58 (2d Cir. 1995).
152. City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1028-29 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 701 (1996).
153. See generally Jacobson et al., supra note 142, at 789.
154. In re Compliant Directed to Station WCBS-TV, New York, N.Y., concerning Fair-
ness Doctrine, Action on Compliant, 8 F.C.C.2d 381, 382, affd and clarified by memoran-
dum opinion and order, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 949 (1967).
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smoking may be a hazard to the smoker's health.' 155 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit expressly affirmed
the Commission's conclusion.15 6 This treatment spurred Judge J. Skelly
Wright, in a later case concerning the ban of cigarette advertising from
broadcast airwaves, to remark:
It would be difficult to argue that there are many who mourn for
the Marlboro Man or miss the ungrammatical Winston jingles.
Most television viewers no doubt agree that cigarette advertis-
ing represents the carping hucksterism of Madison Avenue at its
very worst. Moreover, overwhelming scientific evidence makes
plain that the Salem girl was in fact a seductive merchant of
155. Id. (emphasis added). For a review of that decision, see Robert D. Lynd, Banzhaf
v. FCC: Public Interest and the Fairness Doctrine, 23 FED. COMM. B.J. 39, 49-53 (1969);
Norman P. Leventhal, Caution: Cigarette Commercials May Be Hazardous to Your License
- The New Aspect of Fairness, 22 FED. COMM. B.J. 55, 92-121 (1968). The FCC's decision
led to a heavy barrage of anti-smoking commercials during the next two years, eventually
contributing to the prohibition of broadcast cigarette commercials. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335
(1994) (making it "unlawful to advertise cigarettes ... on any medium of electronic com-
munication"); see also Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 587-89
(D.D.C. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting) (discussing the history of 15 U.S.C. § 1335), affd,
405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
Eventually this application of the Fairness Doctrine became a problem because it man-
dated free air time for the anti-smoking advertisements. That made it attractive for advo-
cates of various issues, such as environmental protection groups, to assert that
advertisements for products other than cigarettes also concerned controversial issues of
public importance. For example, a few years later, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that ads for automobiles with large engines involved
controversial issues related to air pollution. Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164
(D.C. Cir. 1971). As an apparent result, in 1974, the FCC reversed its earlier position
regarding product commercials, stating that "[w]e believe that standard product commer-
cials, such as the old cigarette ads, make no meaningful contribution toward informing the
public on any side of any issue." In re The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness
Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, Fairness Report,
48 F.C.C.2d 1, 24 (1974); see Gregory T. Wuliger, The Constitutional Rights of Puffery:
Commercial Speech and the Cigarette Broadcast Advertising Ban, 36 FED. COMM. L.J. 1
(1984) (attacking the constitutionality of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969
as violation of the First Amendment). Eventually, under Reagan Administration pressure
to deregulate, the FCC abolished the Fairness Doctrine altogether. In re Complaint of
Syracuse Peace Council against Television Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5057 (1987);
see Mark A. Conrad, The Demise of the Fairness Doctrine: A Blow for Citizen Access, 41
FED. COMM. L.J. 161, 163 (1989) (arguing that Syracuse Peace Council was decided
incorrectly).
156. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert denied sub nom. Tobacco
Inst., Inc. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). In Banzhaf the Court declared:
[W]here, as here, one party to a debate has a financial clout and a compelling
economic interest in the presentation of one side unmatched by its opponent, and
where the public stake in the argument is no less than life itself - we think the
purpose of rugged debate is served, not hindered, by an attempt to redress the
balance.
Id. at 1103.
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death - that the real 'Marlboro Country' is the graveyard. But
the First Amendment does not protect only speech that is
healthy or harmless. The Court of Appeals in this circuit has
approved the view that 'cigarette advertising implicitly states a
position on a matter of public controversy'. . . . For me, that
finding is enough to place such advertising within the core protec-
tion of the First Amendment.157
Yet, the public interest and controversy surrounding this issue a quarter
century ago was far less intense than today.
Over the past few years private organizations associated with the
health industry have taken an active lead in the anti-smoking and anti-
tobacco advertising crusades. In 1986, the AMA joined Surgeon General
Koop in his call for a ban on tobacco advertising.158 Since then, the
American Heart Association, American Cancer Society, and American
Lung Association have joined the battle, combining forces to condemn
the Joe Camel ad campaign. 159
Some activist groups have formed with the specific objective of com-
batting the tobacco industry. These groups include Stop Teenage Addic-
tion to Tobacco, 160 the Coalition on Smoking OR Health, Action on
Smoking and Health, the Tobacco Products Liability Project, 161 and the
Group Against Smoking Pollution. 16 Broader interest organizations, in-
cluding the Advocacy Institute and Ralph Nader's Public Citizen Litiga-
tion Group, have joined these anti-smoking groups.163
While not all efforts are as organized as those mentioned above, many
other groups and individuals have taken up the anti-tobacco banner.
Reverend Butts, of the Abyssinian Church of Harlem, and his supporters
started a movement when they began whitewashing tobacco billboards in
Harlem."64 Similar actions quickly followed in several other metropolitan
157. Capital Broadcasting, 333 F. Supp. at 587 (Wright, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
158. The AMA's House of Delegates was nearly unanimous in its support of a resolu-
tion to call for a federal law banning all tobacco advertising. George E. Curry, AMA's
Proposed Tobacco-Ad Ban Lights Legal Fire, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 1985, § 3 at 21.
159. These three groups petitioned the FTC to "'take immediate action against RJR's
cartoon camel."' Judann Dagnoli, 'JAMA' Lights New Fire Under Camel's Ads, ADVER-
TISING AGE, Dec. 16, 1991, at 3.
160. See Rich, supra note 9, at 54.
161. Claudia MacLachlan, In the Trenches: Activists Call It a Movement, NAT'L L.J.,
May 2, 1994, at A21.
162. Frederic M. Biddle, Storekeepers Caught in a Cloud of Smoke, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 29, 1993, at 75.
163. See MacLachlan, supra note 161.
164. Bob Groves, Smoke and Brimstone; Harlem Pastor Trumpets Sins of Advertising,
THE RECORD, Oct. 14, 1990, at LOI.
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areas. 165 In addition, many businesses have acquiesced to anti-smoking
sentiments. McDonald's, Taco Bell, and Jack-in-the-Box all have de-
clared their company-owned restaurants, totalling over five thousand, to
be smoke-free.' 66 Public pressure to end smoking is at a fever pitch.
Not everyone supports the crusade to end smoking. Approximately
fifty-two million Americans continue to smoke, and many of them are
fighting back. Activist organizations, including the National Smokers Al-
liance,' 67 the United Smokers Association,168 and the American Puffer
Alliance, have sprung up to fight for smokers' rights. 169 When one town
considered a ban on two-for-one cigarette promotions, a local radio talk
show host encouraged listeners to call the responsible government
agency and protest.' 7 ° Likewise, popular radio and television personality
Rush Limbaugh frequently ridicules the anti-smoking crusade. 171 When
OSHA proposed regulations to restrict smoking in virtually every work-
place, the Agency received about fifty thousand letters, most of which
opposed the action. 17
2
Numerous commentators have argued against limiting tobacco ads,
pointing out that it would severely harm the media that relies on such
advertising, 73 it would unfairly deprive companies of hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars already invested in advertising campaigns,' 74 and it is pa-
ternalistic.1 75 Focusing on the product, others argue that banning
165. Alison Fahey and Judann Dagnoli, PM Ready to Deal with Outdoor Ad Foes, AD-
VERTISING AGE, June 18, 1990, at 3. This approach has been used in Houston, Baltimore,
and Chicago, among others. Id.
166. See Taylor, supra note 5, at A10.
167. See id. (quoting one smoker who said, "'At this point it has nothing to do with
whether I like to smoke or not. It has to do with resenting being told what I can and can't
do."')
168. Kenton Robinson, Where There's Smoke, There's Fight: Fuming For Freedom,
HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 11, 1994, at A7 (describing the effects of the United Smokers
Association).
169. Id.
170. Biddle, supra note 162, at 75.
171. Jan Glidewell, They're All Blowing Smoke, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 28, 1994,
at 8 (discussing how the anti-smoking debate emerged as a political issue).
172. Kara Swisher, OSHA Flooded with Angry Mail Opposing Workplace Smoking
Ban, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1994, at B1. The Agency also has received almost a dozen
death threats. Id.
173. See supra notes 8-18 and accompanying text (discussing the restrictions on tobacco
advertising).
174. See Brett Shevack, Ban Joe Camel Campaign? That's Unfair, ADVERTISING AGE,
Sept. 20, 1993, at 28 (arguing that the issue of cigarette marketing must be addressed deci-
sively and not on a case-by-case basis).
175. James J. Kilpatrick, A Cigarette Ad Smoke Screen, NATION'S Bus., Feb. 1986, at 6
(contending that "in a free society, the people must be free to do foolish things").
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cigarettes would create illegal trafficking and crime,' 76 and that smoking
bans already have cost restaurants significant losses in sales. 177 To many
of those who are now fighting back, this is simply a matter of civil
rights. 78 Smokers are seeing their freedoms evaporate as quickly as the
smoke they exhale.
There is evidence that even those who do not actively fight the anti-
smoking pressures, including some non-smokers, may rebel against these
efforts in other ways. One marketing consultant suggests some adults are
tired of the "politically correct" healthy life and have started smoking as
a form of revolt.179 One study found that efforts to discourage cigarette
sales to children actually encourage underage smoking,180 and some mar-
keting executives believe that the negative publicity surrounding Joe
Camel actually could be increasing the brand's market share.' 81 In at
least one case a smoker reacted violently to the anti-smoking pressure:
after a group of people in a restaurant complained about her smoking,
Daphnye Luster left the restaurant, returned with a shotgun, and killed
one of the women who complained.182
This "boomerang effect" of anti-smoking activism is apparent in the
upsurge in popularity of cigar smoking. Between 1989 and 1993, cigar
sales rose twenty-four percent, cigar clubs sprung up in cities across the
176. James Flanigan, Cigarette Fight Is Really About Money, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Apr. 17, 1994, at H4 (arguing that a ban on cigarettes would create a $100 billion a year
U.S. illegal market).
177. R. Michelle Breyer, Eateries Say Profits Going Up in Smoke, AUSTIN AM.-STATES-
MAN, Apr. 17, 1994, at HI (reporting a Southern California Business Association finding
that a smoking ban caused an average decline of 24% in restaurant sales).
178. See Robinson, supra note 168. David Brenton, founder of the Smokers' Rights
Alliance, believes the government has gone too far in forcing us to adopt what it deter-
mines to be a healthy lifestyle:
If in fact it's my duty as a citizen of the United States to live as long as I can, and
to produce as much wealth as I possibly can so I can pay as many taxes as I
possibly can, then I don't live in a free state. I live in a fascist society.
Id.
179. See Tomkins, supra note 113. Faith Popcorn, a New York marketing consultant,
refers to this as a "pleasure revenge." Id.
180. Paul Raeburn, Tobacco Industry Fails in Efforts to Curb Youth Market, Studies
Find, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 1, 1992, at A3. Dr. Joseph R. DiFranza conducted a study
of a tobacco industry campaign ostensibly designed to discourage children from smoking.
Id. However, because smoking was depicted as an adult activity, Dr. DiFranza concluded
that smoking is presented as a "forbidden fruit." Id.
181. See Joanne Lipman, Joe Camel's Bad Press Could Be Boosting Brand, WALL ST.
J., May 14, 1992, at B1. Between December 1991 and May 1992, more than 500 newspaper
and magazine articles mentioned Joe Camel, and virtually all of them did so in a negative
context. Id. Some observers caution that this invites teens and pre-teens to smoke as an
act of rebellion. Id.




country, special cigar dinners (termed "cigar smokers") became popular
at high-priced hotels, and even cigar clubs for women, who traditionally
were not considered cigar smokers, became popular.183 The Cigar Asso-
ciation of America states that sales in the first five months of 1995 were
just over forty-five percent higher than during the same period in 1994.'84
President Clinton's recent proposal to curtail cigarette manufacturers'
sponsorship of sporting events185 has the potential to pull large numbers
of sports enthusiasts into the debate. Automobile racing, for example, is
heavily dependent on tobacco company sponsors. A decrease in tobacco
sponsorship could hurt the sport and, ultimately, the spectators. 186  The
impact on spectators may explain why an Associated Press poll found
that fifty-eight percent of Americans disagreed with the President's call
to ban tobacco brand names on t-shirts and sporting events, 87 even
though fewer than half of that group smokes,188 and even though two-
thirds of Americans support increased government restrictions on ciga-
rette advertising. 189
This is not a one-sided issue. Indeed, the smoking debate is one of the
most controversial issues of our time. And, because the debate encom-
passes serious health concerns, it undoubtedly is one of the most impor-
tant issues. Because the smoking debate is such a major public issue,
183. William G. Flanagan & Toddi Gutner, Cigar Power, FORBES, Aug. 1, 1994, at 100.
These authors attribute the rise of cigar smoking to anti-smoking pressures, stating:
Nowadays, lighting up a lonsdale is rebelling against political correctness. It's a
way of telling the antismoking crusaders and other busybodies to go to hell. And
cigar smokers are joining together in defiance to enjoy their forbidden fruit. Ci-
gar clubs are popping up from Cincinnati to Norfolk, from Milwaukee to Tokyo.
Id.
184. Todd Pruzan, Stogies for Fogies? Puffing Now Upscale, ADVERTISING AGE, Aug.
21, 1995, at 1.
185. Bruce Horovitz et al., Clinton Lights a Fire Under Smokes and Sports, USA To-
DAY, Aug. 11, 1995, at B1 (reporting that President Clinton proposed a ban on cigarette
brand names in sports sponsorship).
186. Id. Andy Hall, a spokesman for NASCAR, the sanctioning body for stock car
racing, stated that "'[i]t could create additional financial hardships for sports fans."' Id.;
see also Kate Fitzgerald, Tobacco Plan Aims to Choke Sports Sponsorship, ADVERTISING
AGE, Aug. 14, 1995, at 33 (discussing the impact of Clinton's ban on women's tennis and
stock car racing in particular); Roger Thurow et al., Ban on Tobacco Ads Might Stall Auto
Racing, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 1995, at B1 (describing the close ties between auto racing
and tobacco companies).
187. See Howard Goldberg, Poll: Americans Want Clinton to Back Off Tobacco Ad At-
tack, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 23, 1995, at AI0 (discussing a poll in which 1,007
adults were surveyed between August 16 and 20, just a few days after President Clinton
announced his proposal).
188. See Farley, supra note 7, at 61. The segment of the population that smokes is
reported to be about 26%. Id.
189. See Colford & Teinowitz, supra note 10, at 1.
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speech regarding this topic deserves "uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open" debate.19 ° The government, however, endorses only one
viewpoint.
C. The Official View
Efforts to ban tobacco advertising began with Surgeon General Koop's
call-to-arms, which Congress quickly followed with a bill that died in
committee. Although a few members fought vociferously, year after
year, to pass a tobacco bill, Congress has never been able to agree on the
terms of a bill. As a result, those representatives and government offi-
cials whose efforts were defeated in Congress have engaged in a cam-
paign to sway public opinion, thereby convincing individuals, private
industries, state and local governments, and Congress to take action. Of-
ficials have even used advertising to spread the anti-tobacco-advertising
message.19'
As then FTC Chairman Daniel Oliver remarked a few years ago:
The American marketplace for ideas is decentralized and occurs
in numerous arenas: in Congress, in academia, in books and
pamphlets, in newspapers, over the airways, over backyard
fences, at the workplace, door-to-door. Seldom does the gov-
ernment step in to crown a victor or promulgate an official ver-
sion of the truth. In the debate over public policies regarding
smoking ... the government has not only based its policies on
an official version of the truth, it has compelled private citizens
to propagandize in favor of that version of the truth.' 9
Clearly, there is an "official" view of tobacco and associated promotional
messages that are endorsed implicitly by those officials, who have used
their positions to promote an anti-tobacco-advertising agenda:
1. Tobacco advertising causes people to smoke.
2. Smoking causes death.
3. It is the government's responsibility to protect its citizens
from death.
190. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
191. See Ads Blow Smoke on Cigarette Advertising, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 5,
1992, at A7. The Minnesota Department of Public Health spent $321,000 on an advertising
initiative to discourage smoking among women. Id. The initiation was aimed at convinc-
ing women that tobacco companies have been manipulating them. Id. In addition, Sur-
geon General Antonia Novello made a series of public service announcements criticizing
tobacco advertising and marketing practices. Fara Warner, Novello Throws Down the
Gauntlet, ADWEEK'S MARKETING WK., Mar. 16, 1992, at 4.
192. In re R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 111 F.T.C. 539, 551-52 (1988) (Oliver, Chairman,
dissenting) (footnote omitted) (arguing that a tobacco company's publication deserved full
First Amendment protection).
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4. Therefore, government should do everything in its power to
abolish tobacco and anything that promotes it.
Even if one accepts that smoking kills, the other points remain debata-
ble.1 93 Legislation restricting tobacco ads would limit the voices of those
who disagree with that official stance.
An effort to silence one side of the debate constitutes viewpoint dis-
crimination, and thus, runs afoul of the First Amendment.194 In First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,195 several corporations sought to
publish their views regarding a state referendum concerning a personal
income tax, but a state law prohibited corporations from spending money
to influence such a vote. 19 6 Indeed, the law singled out individual taxa-
tion as a subject corporations could not address publicly. 197 The Supreme
Court announced that, because this speech otherwise would be protected,
it does not lose its protection simply because the speaker is a corporation.
The Court added, "[e]specially where, as here, the legislature's suppres-
sion of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public
question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First
Amendment is plainly offended."' 9
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.'99 involved a federal statute
that prohibited mailing unsolicited advertisements for contraceptive de-
vices. 200 Because the advertisements contained "truthful information rel-
193. See Jacobsen et al., supra note 142, at 800. In addition to the continuing question
about whether advertising causes tobacco consumption, the extent of government respon-
sibility and authority are subject to serious disagreement. For example, one group of re-
searchers noted:
The tension between individual liberties and governmental intervention to pro-
tect public health remains the fundamental point of contention in determining the
need for and extent of antismoking legislation. That the state has the right to
regulate smoking to secure the public's health is beyond question. The policy
debate is about when, how, and under what circumstances the state should exer-
cise that power.
Id. However, their assertion that the state's right to protect the public health is beyond
question remains arguable. As we have seen with the recent public debates about Dr.
Kervorkian and physician-assisted suicide, there is a significant segment of the public that
disputes the government's authority to protect its citizens from death under all circum-
stances. See Albert R. Jonsen, Physician-Assisted Suicide, 18 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 459
(1995); Susan Machler, People With Pipes: A Question of Euthanasia, 16 PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 781 (1993).
194. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its purest form .....
195. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
196. Id. at 767-68.
197. Id. at 768.
198. Id. at 785-86.
199. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
200. Id. at 61.
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evant to important social issues such as family planning and the
prevention of venereal disease," the Court declared the law unconstitu-
tional.2"1 In his concurrence, Justice Stevens noted that the law did not
prohibit advertisements for devices intended to facilitate conception,
thereby excluding only "one advocate from a forum to which adversaries
have unlimited access., 20 2 He noted that "[g]overnmental suppression of
a specific point of view strikes at the core of First Amendment values.
20 3
More recently, the Court reaffirmed its stance against viewpoint dis-
crimination in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.2°4 In R.A.V. a teenager was
charged with violating the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance after
burning a cross on the lawn of a black family.2°5 The ordinance prohib-
ited displaying symbols, such as a Nazi swastika or a burning cross, in
such a way that would anger others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion, or gender.2 °6 The Court found this to be a clear case of view-
point discrimination. 2 7 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, declared:
In fact the only interest distinctly served by the content limita-
tion is that of displaying the city council's special hostility to-
wards the particular biases thus singled out. That is precisely
what the First Amendment forbids. The politicians of St. Paul
are entitled to express that hostility - but not through the
means of imposing unique limitations upon speakers who (how-
ever benightedly) disagree.20 8
The R.A.V. decision expanded the concept of viewpoint discrimination,
applying it to fighting words, which previously had been considered
wholly outside protections afforded by the First Amendment.20 9
201. Id. at 69. The Court determined that the First Amendment protected Youngs's
proposed commercial speech. Id.
202. Id. at 84 (Stevens, J., concurring).
203. Id. (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976)).
204. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
205. Id. at 379-80.
206. Id. at 380.
207. Id. at 391. The opinion stated:
In its practical operation ... the ordinance goes even beyond mere content dis-
crimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination. Displays containing some words
- odious racial epithets, for example - would be prohibited to proponents of all
views. But 'fighting words' that do not themselves invoke race, color, creed, reli-
gion, or gender - aspersions upon a person's mother, for example - would
seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor of racial,
color, etc., tolerance and equality, but could not be used by those speakers'
opponents.
Id.
208. Id. at 396.
209. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (stressing that fighting
words constitute "no essential part of any exposition of ideas," and therefore, are accorded
no First Amendment protection).
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Consequently, even if we reject tobacco advertising as political speech,
R.A.V. suggests that commercial speech, which resides above fighting
words on the First Amendment hierarchy, is likewise protected from
viewpoint discrimination.210 If, for example, cigarette ads were banned
or restricted to non-pictorial matter, anti-smoking forces could use
images of Joe Camel or the Marlboro Man while tobacco manufacturers
could not. If a law prohibited claims that smoking makes you slim, sexy,
sociable, sophisticated, and successful, then nothing would prevent oppo-
nents from alleging that, for example, smoking will make you unattractive
and a social pariah.
The purpose of the R.A.V. ordinance-reducing hate crimes-was
commendable, as is the goal of reducing tobacco-related health problems.
In spite of that auspicious goal, the Court refused to permit the govern-
ment to silence a politically disfavored viewpoint.21' Though R.A.V. did
not explicitly elevate cross burning to the level of political expression,1 2
it seemingly turned on the political correctness of the government's posi-
tion.213 The fact that certain speech is considered politically correct nec-
essarily implies that it is a politically-charged issue, and that a major
political faction supports a given viewpoint. Whether R.A. V. can be read
as elevating unprotected speech to a parity with political speech, it clearly
stands for the proposition that government must not exercise its powers
to favor an officially-endorsed viewpoint on a politically-charged topic,
even if that speech takes a form that normally resides low on the hierar-
chy of First Amendment values.2 14
210. See Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case
for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 790 (1993) ("The
rules making content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination presumptively invalid ap-
ply to all government regulation of speech, even when it falls within a category such as
fighting words or obscenity that normally receives little or no First Amendment protection.
This principle applies to all speech, including commercial speech.").
211. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396.
212. Justice White, however, felt the majority's opinion implicitly equated cross-burn-
ing with political speech: "By placing fighting words, which the Court has long held to be
valueless, on at least equal constitutional footing with political discourse and other forms
of speech that we have deemed to have the greatest social value, the majority devalues the
latter category." Id. at 403 (White, J., concurring). Justice Stevens gave it a similar read-
ing: "Assuming that the Court is correct that this last class of speech is not wholly 'unpro-
tected,' it certainly does not follow that fighting words and obscenity receive the same sort
of protection afforded core political speech. . . . Perversely, this gives fighting words
greater protection than is afforded commercial speech." Id. at 422-23 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
213. Justice Blackmun recognized this thread running through the opinion: "I fear that
the Court has been distracted from its proper mission by the temptation to decide the issue
over 'politically correct speech' and 'cultural diversity,' neither of which is presented here."
Id. at 415-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
214. See supra text accompanying note 210.
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Of course, a large portion of the population agrees with the official
view of tobacco and tobacco advertising. The First Amendment, how-
ever, "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered
out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative se-
lection. To many that is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked
upon it our all.",215 Indeed, the absence of proof that tobacco advertising
increases aggregate consumption demonstrates that at least a part of the
official view might be wrong. This danger of an erroneous official view is
what Justice Brandeis referred to as "the occasional tyrannies of gov-
erning majorities, '216 and this threat of tyranny is the very reason why
political speech is protected with such vigilance. It is the fallibility of gov-
ernment officials that necessitates protecting the voice of dissent.
Involvement of government officials and agencies in the active promo-
tion of an official view on tobacco advertising, toward the end of silencing
the opposition, is a textbook example of viewpoint discrimination. By
favoring a single perspective, the "government is not only attempting to
control the individual's awareness of an option he may pursue.., but also
to control what the individual believes about this option." '217 As Justice
Brennan once argued, "no differences between commercial and other
kinds of speech justify protecting commercial speech less extensively
where ... the government seeks to manipulate private behavior by de-
priving citizens of truthful information concerning lawful activities."21
One need not be a First Amendment absolutist to recognize that govern-
ment-induced thought-control is antithetical to any viable construct of
freedom.
In all respects but one, tobacco advertising fits squarely within the
traditional political speech construct. Few issues have reaped as much, let
alone more, political attention or public controversy during the first half
of this decade. Homosexuals in the military, abortion, and health care
are topics that have gained a similar level of public attention, and speech
concerning any of those topics would clearly garner First Amendment
protection as political speech. Only its commercial aspects make tobacco
advertising seem alien in the company of civil rights marches and war
protests. In fact, if this controversy concerned a potentially dangerous
method of teaching, such as extolling the benefits of fascism, instead of a
215. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd, 326
U.S. 1 (1945).
216. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
217. Matthew L. Miller, Note, The First Amendment and Legislative Bans of Liquor
and Cigarette Advertisements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 632, 651 (1985).
218. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328,
351 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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potentially dangerous commercial message, then there is little doubt that
the Supreme Court would place it in the realm of political speech. But to
place commercial advertising, especially tobacco advertising, at that same
high level of concern is, to many, offensive in the extreme.
D. Drawing the Line on Political Speech
Because tobacco advertising promotes a product, it might seem easy to
label it commercial speech, and relegate it low on the hierarchy of First
Amendment values. No other product or its advertising, however, has
been the subject of so much political activity, popular concern, and con-
troversy. In addition, no other product or its advertising has been sub-
jected to a similar concerted governmental effort to sway public opinion
to an official viewpoint. In those respects, tobacco advertising bears little
resemblance to ads for soap or furniture.
In reality, tobacco ads are both commercial and political speech. Be-
cause the two classifications are subject to different levels of First
Amendment scrutiny, there is no choice but to categorize tobacco adver-
tising as one or the other. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has neither
established a bright line test to distinguish between commercial and fully
protected speech2 19 nor articulated a principled justification for this bifur-
cation of speech protections.220 How much commercial content is suffi-
cient to disqualify otherwise political speech from fully-protected status?
Conversely, how much political content is required to elevate an other-
wise commercial message to be fully embraced by the First Amendment?
With neither a test nor guiding principles it is virtually impossible to draw
any defensible conclusions as to how this mixed speech should be
categorized.
Several legal scholars have attempted to retro-fit a theory into the com-
mercial/noncommercial dichotomy. They argue that commercial speech
is an integral part of economic activity over which government has clear
219. In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 111 F.T.C. 539, 543-44 (1988); Metromedia, Inc.
v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 536 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
220. See McGowan, supra note 65, at 360 (The Court has neither articulated a coherent
theory explaining why commercial speech should or should not be protected, nor defined
commercial speech in a way that predictably classifies different types of speech."). Several
other commentators have recognized this same weakness in the Court's hierarchy-of-
speech approach. C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Free-
dom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 1 (1976) (noting that the commercial speech exception has been
ill defined); see Mack, supra note 66, at 72; Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and
Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1212, 1223 (1983); Todd F. Simon, Defining Commercial Speech: A Focus on Process
Rather Than Content, 20 NEW ENG. L. REV. 215, 216 (1984-85).
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authority, 221 or that profit-motivated speech "lacks the crucial connec-
tions with individual liberty and self-realization which exist for speech
generally," 222 or even that commercial speech is co-opting the ideals
which historically drove our society with "commercial-dependent self-de-
termination., 223 These authors appear unified in one respect: they have
little regard for commercial advertising and perhaps capitalism. 224
At the same time, several authors have suggested that the Court's fail-
ure to provide either an operable definition or viable theory to clarify the
commercial speech doctrine results from the fact that commercial speech
is indistinguishable from fully protected forms of speech.225 The major
221. See Thomas H. Jackson & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1979) ("Advertising is neither
more nor less significant than a host of other market activities that legislatures concededly
may regulate.")
222. Baker, supra note 220, at 3. Baker believes that because profit orientation is a
coercive force, capitalist enterprise externally imposes forces that strip both buyers and
sellers of free will. Id. at 14. Free speech, he posits, exists only in the absence of such
coercion. Id. at 7. Therefore, he asserts that "domination of profit, a structurally required
standard, breaks the connection between speech and any vision, or attitude, or value of the
individual or group engaged in advocacy." Id. at 17.
223. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 697, 735 (1993). The essence of their argument is that commercial culture, created
largely by advertising, has become so ingrained in our society that it is now impossible to
separate commerce from communication. Id. at 698-99. The consequence is that we are
forced to protect commercial speech in order to protect our culture, and thus, traditional
speech values, such as self-realization and rational decision-making, have no currency in
the debate over commercial speech. See id. at 699.
224. Professors Collins and Skover, for example, characterize advertising as follows:
There is something of a parasitic quality about ... [commercial] advertising. It
feeds on the organisms of noncommercial culture - the culture's past and pres-
ent, ideology and myths, politics and customs, art and architecture, literature and
music, and even its religions .... For example, women are commodified to sell
everything from cars to colognes .... Advertising thus pimps its products.
Id. at 709-10. Professors Jackson and Jeffries state that "[m]easured in terms of traditional
first amendment principles, commercial speech is remarkable for its insignificance." See
Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 221, at 14. Evidence of Professor Baker's attitude toward
advertising becomes more obvious when his other works aside from his 1976 piece, supra
note 220, are considered. For example, in a later article, he argues that advertising is re-
sponsible for censoring the news we receive from journalistic news sources, and therefore,
should be regulated. C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 2097, 2099 (1992).
225. See Coase, supra note 21 at 32-33; Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid
of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 628 (1990) (arguing that the commercial
noncommercial distinction makes no sense); Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court and
Commercial Speech: New Words and an Old Message, 72 MiN,. L. REV. 289, 292
(1987) (recommending the least restrictive regulatory alternative for commercial speech);
Mack, supra note 66, at 72 (recognizing the superficiality of classifying speech as either
commercial or noncommercial); McGowan, supra note 65, at 360 (noting that the Court
failed to define commercial speech so that classifying different types of speech becomes
predictable); Burt Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial
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thrust of their arguments is that, no matter what dimension is used, any
attempt to draw a definitive boundary around commercial speech will
necessarily sweep within that perimeter other, more honorable, speech.
The notion of "profit motive" demonstrates the difficulty encountered
in attempting to distinguish commercial from noncommercial speech.
Profit motive is an insufficient basis for identifying speech as commercial
because even great works of art and literature are usually created with an
eye toward earning money.226 Even newspapers are sold for profit. Fur-
ther, neither "sales" nor "solicitation" is adequate because many political
and religious organizations engage in these activities.227 Trning speech
protection upon whether the speech concerns a "commercial product or
service" is equally problematic because news reports about such products
would receive diminished protection under such a definition.228 Even if
one could find an adequate dimension by which to distinguish the com-
mercial from the noncommercial, there still would be the problem of ex-
plaining why speech on that dimension is less deserving of protection.
Although the Court repeatedly has stated that "there are 'common-
sense differences' between commercial speech and other varieties," '229
those supposed differences continue to elude both legal scholars and the
Court. Each time the Court alludes to those commonsense differences, it
points to a footnote in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy that suggests
commercial speech may be more easily verifiable and may be more able
Speech, 46 BROOK. L. REV. 437, 462 (1980) (stating commercial speech should be pro-
tected under the First Amendment because of its value in disseminating information); Shif-
frin, supra note 220, at 1216 (rejecting the premises that commercial speech is not political
and does not involve self-expression); Smolla, supra note 210, at 790. This point is illus-
trated in a remark Justice Brennan made a few years ago: "If anything, our cases recognize
the difficulty in making a determination that speech is either 'commercial' or 'noncommer-
cial."' Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 539 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
226. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 761 (1976) (noting that speech does not lose constitutional protection merely because
it is a paid advertisement); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973) (stating that profit motive is not a valid basis for regulatory
speech); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (rejecting the argument
that because an ad is paid for it is not constitutionally protected).
227. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.
228. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761-62.
229. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz. 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) (noting there are "commonsense" differences in
First Amendment protection of commercial speech). For cases quoting Ohralik, see
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co. 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 64 (1983); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 562 (1980).
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to survive legal restrictions than other speech.23 ° While the reference to
commonsense differences has been repeated so often that it has achieved
a sheen of fact and has served as the basis for several restrictions on com-
mercial expression, no evidence of superior verifiability or durability ever
has surfaced, and scholars have pointed out fallacies of those
justifications.2 3'
In fact, the verifiability of any speech depends upon whether it entails
fact or opinion. Factual statements, whether by politicians or product
manufacturers, frequently can be verified, while opinion statements by
those same parties will defy such proof. The Supreme Court acknowl-
232Thedged the distinction between fact and opinion many years ago. The
durability of speech depends upon the dedication of the speaker. Be-
cause some speakers who voice political positions are willing to risk death
or imprisonment to voice their grievances or ideologies, the conclusion
that commercial speech is more durable seems to trivialize the convic-
tions of those who put their lives on the line to express their political or
religious beliefs. Indeed, it seems unlikely that a speaker would risk ex-
treme penalties to deliver a commercial message. Thus, the only two jus-
tifications the Court has proffered, in twenty years of treating commercial
speech as an inferior genus, lack facial validity. Therefore, speech cannot
230. That footnote declares:
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we
have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. There are com-
monsense differences between speech that does 'no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction,'. . . and other varieties. Even if the differences do not justify
the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus subject to complete
suppression by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of pro-
tection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial
information is unimpaired. The truth of commercial speech, for example, may be
more easily verifiable by its disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or polit-
ical commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate informa-
tion about a specific product or service that he himself provides and presumably
knows more about than anyone else. Also, commercial speech may be more du-
rable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial prof-
its, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone
entirely.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24 (citations omitted).
231. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 225, at 634-38 (arguing the justification of ver-
ifiability and durability, as reason for giving commercial speech less protection that non-
commercial speech, are unsupported); McGowan, supra note 65, at 408-10 (concluding that
commercial speech doctrine is threatening constitutional principles without good reason).
232. When a school promoted its philosophy that the mind alone was capable of healing
many human ills, its mail was alleged to be fraudulent. See American Sch. of Magnetic
Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 103 (1902). The Supreme Court, however, announced
that unless the question of the mind's power could be reduced to an issue of fact, rather
than mere opinion, it could not be proved fraudulent. Id. at 104.
1194
1996] Politicizing Cigarette Advertising 1195
be classified as either commercial or noncommercial based upon the de-
gree to which it meets the verifiability and durability criteria.
The Court has defined commercial speech as that which does "no more
than propose a commercial transaction." '233 Unfortunately, this definition
does nothing to illuminate the reason behind diminished protection for
such speech. Presumably, the Court believes that a commercial proposal
is less important than political speech, though the relative worth of any
form of speech is subject to debate. More important for the present issue
is that this definition is open to varied interpretations.
Judge Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner recently questioned the
Court's definition of commercial speech, noting that few advertisements
for products or services explicitly propose a commercial transaction, es-
pecially those that consist primarily of image.234 They further noted that
most ads do far more than propose a commercial transaction, offering the
reader, listener, or viewer a form of art and/or entertainment.235 In addi-
tion, the definition of commercial speech is somewhat circular because it
fails to define "commercial transaction." Of course, some ads blur these
lines more than others. A recent advertising campaign for Benetton
clothing, for example, displays nothing but controversial photographs,
such as those that portray couples of mixed genders and races kissing, or
nuns kissing priests. 236 The Court's definition makes these ads, which are
obviously intended to sell clothes, appear to be noncommercial. By con-
trast, a Christian Children's Fund ad that asks for a commitment of
twenty-one dollars per month to support an underprivileged child might
easily fall within that definition of "commercial speech," even though the
purpose underlying the ad is charity and not commercial.
The only case, to date, where the Court specifically deliberated on the
commercial/noncommercial distinction is Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp.2 3 7 In that case, the Court acknowledged the difficulties inherent in
233. For a discussion of the Court's preference for this definition, see City of Cincinnati
v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 412 (1993); Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 426;
Board of Trustees v. Fox. 492 U.S. 469, 473 (1989); Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637; Bolger,
463 U.S. at 66; Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 505 (1981); Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 762; Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
234. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 225, at 638-40 (focusing on examples found in
television and record video advertisements).
235. Id.
236. Genevieve Buck, There's Controversy at Benetton - and It's Not Over Clothes, CI.
TRIB., Aug. 14, 1991, at 6; Philip Kennicott, In the Age of AIDS: Arts & Agony, DETROIT
NEWS, Aug. 8, 1995, at El.
237. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
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drawing a line between the two forms of speech.238 Youngs Drug Prod-
ucts mailed unsolicited contraceptive advertisements to consumers.
2 39
Some of the ads in question were more than proposals to engage in a
commercial transaction because they were informational pamphlets that
discussed the general desirability and availability of prophylactics .4° The
Court admitted that while these were advertisements that named a spe-
cific product and were motivated by clear economic interests, none of
those individual factors was sufficient to make the pamphlets commercial
speech.241 The Court, however, concluded that "[t]he combination of all
these characteristics ... provides strong support for the .. .conclusion
that the informational pamphlets are properly characterized as commer-
cial speech," despite the fact that "they contain discussions of important




One might read that decision as a direct parallel to cigarette advertis-
ing, thereby making it commercial. Such a reading, however, would ig-
nore the fact that the Court interpreted the Youngs's ads as merely
linking the product to a current public debate.243 If the simple addition
of information about a public debate could effectively elevate a commer-
cial ad to the level of fully protected speech, all advertisers would insert
such information in their ads. Because cigarette advertising is itself the
subject of public debate, it does not fall into that same category.
The Court in Bolger ultimately protected Youngs's ads, while purport-
ing to apply the relaxed standards for commercial speech, because the
regulation denied "to parents truthful information bearing on their ability
to discuss birth control and to make informed decisions in this area.",
2 1
In other words, because the ads contained material of public importance
(fully protected speech), they were protected. It seems that the Court
declared this speech commercial, but then protected it as if it were
noncommercial. 45 In the end, in spite of being labeled commercial,
these ads were treated as fully protected because of the important public
238. Id. at 66.
239. Id. at 62.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 66-67.
242. Id. at 67-68.
243. The Court stated, "We have made clear that advertising which 'links a product to a
current public debate' is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded non-
commercial speech." Id. at 68.
244. Id. at 74.
245. Applying the Central Hudson test, the Court addressed the question of whether
there was a substantial government interest. The Court concluded, "The second interest
asserted by appellants... is undoubtedly substantial.... Because the proscribed informa-
tion 'may bear on one of the most important decisions' parents have a right to make, the
restriction of 'the free flow of truthful information' constitutes a 'basic' constitutional de-
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information contained therein.246 Indeed, Bolger can be read as support-
ing the notion that material of public importance can elevate an other-
wise commercial advertisement to a parity with political speech.
Consequently, that decision, rather than providing clarification, further
blurs the commercial/noncommercial dividing line.
My point is simply this: given the current confusion and problems in-
herent in the commercial speech doctrine, it is very difficult to classify
speech that clearly has both commercial and political aspects as either
one or the other. When speech crosses both dimensions, courts might
default to the commercial speech categorization, the lowest common de-
nominator, thereby lending greater deference to legislative preroga-
tives.24 7 The current commercial speech doctrine neither requires nor
advises such a deferential approach. The danger is that this enables gov-
ernment officials-whether legislative, executive, or judicial-to regulate
speech that they find objectionable, simply by finding some ostensibly
commercial element attached to that speech.248
The deference to government officials is especially easy when a corpo-
ration initiates the speech. Though the Supreme Court has declared that
corporate speakers have First Amendment rights,249 even corporations
that engage in pure political speech-like that in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti2 5 -usually (1) purchase advertising space, (2) identify
the speaker, often by naming a particular "brand" or product, and (3) act
with some underlying economic motivation. Under the Bolger decision,
this would provide strong support for the conclusion that the speech was
commercial. As a result, virtually all corporate speech easily could be
fect regardless of the strength of the government's interest." Id. at 73-75. Thus, this effec-
tively negates the Court's Central Hudson analysis.
246. Id. at 68.
247. Lively, supra note 225, at 295-96; Todd J. Locher, Comment, Board of Trustees of
the State University of New York v. Fox: Cutting Back on Commercial Speech Standards,
75 IOWA L. REV. 1335, 1348 (1990) (stating the characterization of commercial may apply
even if the majority of the material is noncommercial).
248. Judge Kozinski and Stuart Banner argue that the application of commercial speech
classification "'provides a convenient avenue for denying protection to speakers who may
have had something unpopular to say. The more things we find to be commercial speech,
the more expression we can suppress under the cover of economic regulation." Kozinski &
Banner, supra note 225, at 649-50; see also Mack, supra note 66, at 73 (arguing convenient
labeling as commercial speech enables the Court to "engage in [a] charade" of First
Amendment protection); McGowan, supra note 65, at 404 (expressing concern that the
Court need only find a link between speech and profit to classify the speech as commercial
deserving less protection).
249. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) ("The inherent
worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon
the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.").
250. Id.
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labeled commercial, regardless of the topic and irrespective of the First
Amendment rights of corporate speakers.
This scenario is precisely what happened when R.J. Reynolds ran an ad
entitled "Of Cigarettes and Science," which discussed a scientific study
and suggested that the study cast doubts on allegations that cigarette
smoking caused heart disease.25' The FTC charged R.J. Reynolds with
deceptive advertising, alleging that the ad failed to disclose certain facts
about the study. 52 The tobacco company argued that the Agency had no
jurisdiction because the ad was not commercial speech, and moved to
dismiss.253 The Administrative Law Judge hearing the case agreed, and
granted the motion. 54 The FTC reversed, and remanded the case, de-
claring that this was a clear case of commercial speech within its jurisdic-
tion. 55 The FTC noted that R.J. Reynolds purchased the ad, and that the
ad referred to a specific product (cigarettes), discussed an important
product attribute (the connection between smoking and heart disease),
and seemed to involve a sales-related motive on the part of the
speaker.256
I would suggest that the FTC's position is indefensible, because any
report of the same or similar study clearly would be protected if reported
by the AMA or any party other than a tobacco company. Many of the
studies discussed earlier, like the Mickey Mouse study and the EPA re-
port, were reported without disclosing some important information, yet
no attempt was made to regulate the ads for deception. This speech did
not propose a commercial transaction, but spoke on an issue of clear pub-
lic interest. Under the FTC's decision in R.J. Reynolds, virtually any to-
bacco company speech, at least any speech that the company would be
motivated to express, would be labelled commercial. The only aspects of
this speech that distinguish it from speech that definitely would be pro-
tected in a newspaper article or editorial are the nature of the corporate
speaker and the fact that it appeared in purchased ad space. First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 57 along with numerous other deci-





256. Id. at 547. Not all of the Commissioners agreed. Chairman Oliver felt the ad was
a "patently direct comment on a public issue" that deserved constitutional protection. Id.
at 568.
257. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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sions, 258 makes it clear that neither of those aspects is a justifiable basis
for diminishing speech protection.
Even speakers who have no corporate ties, such as those fighting for
religious or environmental causes, might be vacuumed into the commer-
cial speech category under the FTC's approach if they engage in fund-
raising activities for their cause. Moreover, newspapers generally have
their price printed at the top of the first page. This would seem to consti-
tute a proposal for a commercial transaction. Although the paper also
contains political information, it could fall victim to any policy that lowers
mixed speech to the inferior First Amendment position. Much of the
speech we value as a society is a blend of both the commercial and non-
commercial. The more readily courts label mixed speech as "commer-
cial," the less protection is afforded to political and other noncommercial
expression. The commercial speech doctrine, therefore, represents a haz-
ardous pothole in our freeway of expression. Courts should take great
pains to steer around it whenever possible, rather than aiming for that
hole at every opportunity. Avoiding this pothole, however, remains
problematic.
Professor Ross Petty recently suggested that one way to draw the line
between commercial and fully-protected speech is to use an audience-
oriented balancing approach that asks whether the audience is more "in-
fluenced or potentially interested in the speech in their capacity as con-
sumers or as members of the electorate., 259 Professor Petty argues that
this method is consonant with Supreme Court precedent and provides a
more objective basis than is possible with the Court's vague guidance to
date.26 ° Professor Petty approaches the problem from a somewhat differ-
ent angle than conventional Court analyses because the "question is not
so much what the speech says as how it is likely to interest people, influ-
ence their beliefs, and motivate them to take action.1261 The audience-
oriented balancing approach seeks to determine the relative balance of
commercial and noncommercial aspects based upon the receivers', rather
than the senders', interests. While this approach, like the Court's, lacks
sufficient specificity and guidance to be a terribly useful tool for deter-
mining which speech deserves full protection and which is less deserving,
258. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
259. Ross D. Petty, Advertising and the First Amendment: A Practical Test for Distin-
guishing Commercial Speech from Fully Protected Speech, 12 J. PuB. POL'Y & MARKETING,
170, 172 (1993).
260. Id. at 172-73.
261. Id. at 173.
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it does provide an interesting framework by which to view the commer-
cial/noncommercial question with regard to tobacco advertising.
In the United States today only about twenty-six percent of the popula-
tion smokes, 26 2 while sixty-eight percent supports stronger regulation of
tobacco advertising.263 If you consider that the latter figure does not in-
clude people with strong anti-regulation sentiments, then the numbers
clearly suggest that tobacco advertising is more likely to affect audience
members in their political capacity (more than sixty-eight percent) than
as consumers of the product (twenty-six percent). More people have a
political interest in tobacco advertising than have a commercial interest.
The commercial aspect of tobacco advertising has been subjugated to the
political. Again, this puts tobacco ads in a unique position within the
realm of commercial speech. Probably no other commercial advertising
ever has piqued such political interest in the community-at-large.
Nevertheless, suppose one concedes that government regulatory efforts
are political, that significant public interest in this topic exists, and the
political impact is greater than the commercial impact. One might still
believe the content of the typical tobacco ad contributes nothing to the
political debate and, therefore, deserves no protection. For example, it
may seem ludicrous to argue that a picture of a man riding a horse has
any political value in public discourse. One may feel that regulation of
these ads will not damage our freedom of speech, as encompassed by the
First Amendment.
E. It is Only Tobacco Advertising
One might argue, for instance, that tobacco ads contribute nothing to
the exposition of ideas,2" because they convey no substantive message.
But if there is no message being conveyed, then there is likewise no argu-
ment for regulation. In its Staff Report on cigarette advertising 265 several
years ago, the FTC declared, "Pictures are better remembered than
words. . . .Therefore, the current warning is much less likely to be
remembered tha[n] the other messages communicated in cigarette advertis-
ing.''266 Congressman Mike Synar, who led congressional efforts to cur-
262. See Farley, supra note 7, at 61.
263. See Colford & Teinowitz, supra note 10, at 1.
264. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (noting that certain
categories of speech, including obscenity, profanity, libelous utterances and fighting words
contribute "no essential part of any exposition of ideas"); see also R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (noting that the categorical approach espoused in Chaplin-
sky remains a limited but important role in First Amendment jurisprudence).
265. MATTHEW L. MYERS ET AL., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON
THE CIGARETTE ADVERTISING INVESTIGATION (1981).
266. Id. at 4-13, 4-14 (emphasis added). The report also stated:
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tail cigarette advertising, remarked that "[T]he implicit message is:
Smoking is OK; it will make you popular and enhance your quality of life.
Nothing could be further from the truth.,2 67 Former Surgeon General
Elders recently announced that cigarette ads send a message that
"[s]moking makes you slim, sexy, sociable, sophisticated and success-
ful,"' 26 8 and former HHS Secretary Louis Sullivan accused tobacco com-
panies of sending a "dangerous mixed message" by sponsoring athletic
events. 269 Even back in the late 1960s the federal government ordered
free counter-advertising for anti-smoking messages because of the one-
sided nature of the information cigarette advertising conveyed on a con-
troversial issue.27° In other words, cigarette ads convey messages, and,
they are messages that officials want to squelch.
Cigarette ads are predominantly pictorial in nature, but that does not
negate the potential for them to communicate messages. Visual imagery
can speak volumes.2 7' Evidence of this principle is frequently encoun-
The ads are rich in thematic imagery associating smoking with warmth, friendli-
ness, outdoor activities, athletics, and individualism. They are filled with
vigorous, attractive, healthy-looking people living energetic lives full of social ac-
ceptance, success, and athletic achievement, free from any smoking hazards. Indi-
viduals seeing these cigarette ads are much more likely, therefore, to use the
concrete positive images of smoking in deciding whether or not to smoke than
they are the abstract general health warning.
Id. at 4-15.
267. Synar, supra note 76, at 10A.
268. See Grady, supra note 13, at A9.
269. Charles Green, Boycott Tobacco-Sponsored Events, Sullivan Urges Athletes, Aus-
TIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 24, 1990, at A10.
270. In re WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381, 382 (letter from Ben F. Waple, FCC Secretary, to
television station WCBS-TV), aff'd on reh'g, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967). It would be ironic, at
best, for the government to now regulate the cigarette advertising industry by concluding
that cigarette advertising conveys no information. At worst, it would suggest that the gov-
ernment is willing to bend the facts in any direction necessary to justify regulating these
miscreants.
271. It is a truism that a picture is worth a thousand words. As one psychologist noted
many years ago:
As a means of communication, pictures speak a universal language. One can pe-
ruse a magazine in a language with which he is unfamiliar and glean something
from the pictures....
Another valuable aspect of the picture is its ability to present at a glance what
it might take a whole paragraph to describe in words. Sometimes an unlimited
verbal account will never approach a picture.
HAROLD E. BURTr, PSYCHOLOGY OF ADVERTISING 267 (1938). The communicative value
of pictures frequently has legal import outside the field of advertising. See Jef I. Richards
& R. Bruce Easter, Televising Executions: The High-Tech Alternative to Public Hangings,
40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 381, 402-06 (1992) (discussing the importance of photographic access
to executions and concluding that televised executions implicate First and Eight Amend-
ment rights); Jef I. Richards, Obscenity and Film: An Empirical Dilemma, 6 Loy. ENT. L.J.
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tered when dealing with advertising.272 For example, the FTC has found
advertising pictures of models wearing white coats to deceptively commu-
nicate that they have medical training.273 A federal court of appeals de-
clared that an ad depicting a clear balloon filled with apparently clear
automobile exhaust deceptively communicated that the exhaust was low
in polluting agents. z74 And the Supreme Court held as deceptive an ad-
7, 23 (1986) (noting that "film is subject to a lower standard of [First Amendment] protec-
tion than books").
272. See Jef I. Richards & Richard D. Zakia, Pictures: An Advertiser's Expressway
Through FTC Regulation, 16 GA. L. REV. 77, 78 (1981) (asserting that the visual advertis-
ing message is more persuasive than the verbal message, and arguing that regulation of the
visual message is therefore more important). Former Deputy Director of the FTC's Bu-
reau of Consumer Protection, Tracy Westen, has stated:
The verbal portions of the ad seem to be trivial throw-aways. I'd be surprised if
one person in 1,000 even stopped to read them. (Indeed, my "conspiratorial"
instincts sometimes tell me that the text is merely a "cover" or pretext designed to
hide the fact that 100% of the ad's communicative value lies in the photograph or
art work.)
Tracy Westen, Malfunction in the Marketplace - Advertising "Versus" Consumer Informa-
tion, AM. MARKETING ASs'N CONF. IN CHICAGO, II1., Aug. 7, 1978. See also Albert H.
Kramer, Marconian Problems, Gutenbergian Remedies: Evaluating the Multiple-Sensory
Experience Ad on the Double-Spaced, Typewritten Page, 30 FED. COMM. L.J. 35, 35-36
(1977) (noting that the advertisers have "created a new environment of multiple-sensory
experience of which the written word is a minor part").
The importance of pictures and other visual imagery to the efficacy of advertisements
has led marketing researchers to devote increasing attention to the study of visual commu-
nication over the past two decades. And these researchers have explicitly or implicitly
recognized the communicative abilities of pictures. Business professors Julie Edell and
Richard Staelin have remarked that "pictures are used extensively to convey information
about the brand, to show its users and uses, and/or to create an image or personality for the
brand." Julie A. Edell & Richard Staelin, The Information Processing of Pictures in Print
Advertisements, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 45, 45 (1983) (emphasis added). An early overview
of this area of study can be found in John R. Rossiter & Larry Percy, Visual Communica-
tion in Advertising, in INFORMATION PROCESSING RESEARCH IN ADVERTISING, 83, 85-88
(Richard J. Harris ed. 1983). Examples of more recent works include Charles S. Areni &
K. Chris Cox, The Persuasive Effects of Evaluation, Expectancy and Relevancy Dimensions
of Incongruent Visual and Verbal Information, 21 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 337 (1994);
Wendy J. Bryce & Richard F. Yalch, Hearing Versus Seeing: A Comparison of Consumer
Learning of Spoken and Pictorial Information in Television Advertising, 15 J. CURRENT
ISSUES & RES. ADVERTISING 1 (1993).
273. In re Mather Hearing Aid Distribs., Inc., 78 F.T.C. 709, 723 (1971); In re Loesch
Hair Experts, 54 F.T.C. 575, 595 (1957); cf In re Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc., 55
F.T.C. 1840, 1849 (1959).
274. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 1978). Standard Oil of Cali-
fornia advertised a fuel additive by showing before-and-after pictures of a clear balloon
inflated with vehicle exhaust. Id. at 655-56. The "before" picture depicted a balloon filled
with black smoke while the "after" picture displayed a clear balloon. Id. The Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals believed that the ad conveyed the message to viewers that the addi-
tive removed many or most of the pollutants from the exhaust. Id. at 657. Although the
product did in fact reduce pollutants, the court stated that these pictures conveyed to con-
sumers a greater degree of pollutant reduction than was true. Id. at 658-59.
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vertising "mock-up" that substituted a picture of sand-covered plexiglas
for a piece of sandpaper.275 In each case the court found that the pictures
at issue communicated a deceptive message. Justice White, writing for
the Court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,276 acknowledged
the communicative value of pictorial representations, and stated that "the
use of illustrations or pictures in advertisements serves important com-
municative functions: it attracts the attention of the audience to the ad-
vertiser's message, and it may also serve to impart information directly.
Accordingly, commercial illustrations are entitled to the First Amend-
ment protections afforded verbal commercial speech .... 277
Yet another argument is that the quality of information cigarette adver-
tising conveys is not the sort of information the First Amendment recog-
nizes. After all, not only are most cigarette ads little more than pictures,
they are also pictures that tell the consumer nothing about the product.
They are merely fantasies-images of a lifestyle, showing people having
fun. In fact, sometimes there is not even a cigarette in the picture. These
image ads are largely emotive, rather than cognitive in nature, providing
no hard facts about the product. Consequently, so the argument goes,
cigarette ads convey no information deserving of First Amendment
protection.278
275. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 376, 390 (1965). In order to sell shav-
ing cream, Colgate-Palmolive illustrated the super-moisturizing qualities of the cream by
supposedly shaving sandpaper. Id. at 376. The commercial depicted the cream being ap-
plied to the sandpaper, it was allowed to soak for a few seconds, then a razor completely
removed the sand. Id. Although the cream actually could shave sandpaper, the required
soaking time was more than an hour, so a plexiglas mock-up was used. Id. However, the
audience was not informed of this substitution, so the FTC determined the commercial to
be deceptive. Id. That finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. Id. at 390.
276. 471 U.S. 626 (1985)
277. Id. at 647.
278. Scholars outside the fields of advertising and marketing, and the general public,
frequently condemn advertising as being devoid of information. See Richard W. Pollay,
The Distorted Mirror: Reflections on the Unintended Consequences of Advertising, 50 J.
MARKETING 18, 25-6 (1986) (noting that many social science scholars find advertising in-
herently irrational). Criticisms of image-type advertising are among the most common.
The popular press undoubtedly has contributed significantly to this suspicion of image ad-
vertising. See WILSON B. KEY, SUBLIMINAL SEDUCTION: AD MEDIA'S MANIPULATION OF
A NOT SO INNOCENT AMERICA 1-10 (1973) (asserting that advertisers manipulate consum-
ers through ads targeted at subliminal perception); VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PER-
SUADERS 46-56 (1957) (providing examples and portraying image-centered advertising
schemes as attempts to create illogical brand loyalties). In those works image advertising is
likened to hypnosis and brain-washing. It seems, however, that much of the criticism re-
sults from ignorance about how advertising is used and how it is made. MICHAEL SCHUD-
SON, ADVERTISING, THE UNEASY PERSUASION: ITS DUBIOUS IMPACT ON AMERICAN
SOCIETY 45 (1984) ("Most criticism of advertising is written in ignorance of what actually
happens inside these [advertising] agencies.").
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Professor Lowenstein makes this point at some length.279 He suggests
there are two categories of advertising: informational and noninforma-
tional. He defines "information" as that which "is likely to provide assist-
ance to a consumer in making a rational purchasing decision, 28" and
"noninformation" as that which "appeals subtly to emotions or to sub-
conscious associations and motivations."'281 An example of the former is
prescription drug price claims, while the latter might be a picture of an
attractive woman accompanied by the headline, "Light my Lucky.,
282
Aside from the obvious point that such a distinction is inherently content-
based and judgmental-placing more value on some forms of information
than others-it reflects a superficial understanding of advertising and,
more generally, communication.283
Nonetheless, this criticism has crept into First Amendment analyses of advertising-as-
speech. Collins and Skover, denouncing commercial speech and Court policies that further
its protection, base their argument on this principle:
Entire categories of commercial communication are essentially bereft of any
real informational content. For cosmetics, fragrances, alcohol, tobacco, clothes.
and other products, billions of advertising dollars say much about image and little
about information. The mass advertiser all too often strives to create a lifestyle
environment with "minimal 'logical' connection with the product."
Collins & Skover, supra note 223, at 737. Collins is co-founder of the Center for the Study
of Commercialism, an organization that exposes and opposes commercialism. Not surpris-
ingly, he has written other works criticizing advertising. See RONALD K.L. COLLINS, Dic-
TATING CONTENT: How ADVERTISING PRESSURE CAN CORRUPT A FREE PRESS 6 (1992)
(asserting that the press often hesitates to report on controversial topics for fear of alienat-
ing advertisers). Collins and others seem to invest image advertising with some sinister
covert purpose and effect, which logically leads to the conclusion that the societal good
demands this form of speech be severely regulated. See also Sut Jhally, Commercial Cul-
ture, Collective Values, and the Future, 71 TEX. L. REV. 805, 814 (1993) (concluding that the
notion of "advertising as a form of information" is "ideologically inspired idiocy" that ex-
acerbates global problems).
279. Daniel H. Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff': Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commer-
cial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1224-37 (1988). Lowenstein is a law professor and,
like most commentators who favor more liberal regulatory policies toward advertising, he
apparently has no formal training or expertise in the field of advertising. See id. at 1205.
280. Id. at 1235.
281. Id. at 1231.
282. See id. at 1232.
283. Legal scholars have stated that:
For years economists struggled to distinguish 'informative' from 'persuasive' ad-
vertising, on the theory that only the former truly benefitted consumers. Most
economists now realize, however, that the distinction is mere 'metaphysics' ...
and that the controversy is simply 'a red herring'. . . . Every advertisement sup-
plies some information, if only a reminder of the firm's existence and the product
the firm sells.
Fred S. McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme Court's Unan-
swered Questions and Questionable Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 69 n.124 (1985) (cita-
tions omitted). Professor Lowenstein attempts to counter this assertion by arguing that the
informational/noninformational distinction "is commonly employed by economists." Low-
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The two types of ad claims that Professor Lowenstein identifies are
frequently recognized by advertising and marketing researchers, and have
been labeled with a variety of names.2 4 Personally, I believe the most
descriptive terminology is "factual" and "evaluative," respectively. 285
The factual ads deal with objective product attributes such as size, shape,
and performance, while the evaluative ads entail subjective attributes,
such as the claim that a particular cologne "will make you sexy.",286 Fac-
tual attributes are intrinsic to the product, while evaluative are extrinsic
or experiential. The latter attributes are called evaluative because con-
sumers must evaluate for themselves whether they experience that attri-
enstein, supra note 279, at 1234. However, Professor Lowenstein cites articles that were
published 18 years earlier as his authority. See id. at 1234 n.107. He fails to recognize that
this time period encompasses a significant shift in paradigms in the field of economics, with
the so-called "Chicago School" largely supplanting the traditional influence of "Harvard
School" economists. Economists who adhere to the Harvard view tend to equate advertis-
ing with persuasion. See WILLIAM S. COMANOR & THOMAS A. WILSON, ADVERTISING
AND MARKET POWER (1974) (providing an in-depth study of former Harvard University
faculty members' research on the impact of advertising on the American economy). By
contrast, the Chicago view conceptualizes advertising as being informative. See Lester G.
Telser, Advertising and Competition, 72 J. POL. ECON. 537 (1964). Professors Albion and
Farris note this distinction between the perception of advertising's role in the economy:
[T]he traditional doctrine maintains that advertising is a form of persuasion that
creates product differentiation and allows firms to exercise market power at the
consumer's expense. The more recent approach views advertising as information
- an inexpensive means for communicating with large numbers of potential buy-
ers - which stimulates competition and diminishes market power.
MARK S. ALBION & PAUL W. FARRIS, THE ADVERTISING CONTROVERSY: EVIDENCE ON
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 25 (1981) (providing a framework for two dis-
tinct schools of thought on the economic impact of advertising). In reality, economists do
not embrace either model as fully describing advertising's effects. See KIM B. ROTZOLL ET
AL., ADVERTISING IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: PERSPECTIVES TOWARD UNDERSTAND-
ING 86-7 (1976).
284. Professor Lowenstein's noninformational category has been called "arbitrary,"
Ivan L. Preston, Theories of Behavior and the Concept of Rationality in Advertising, 17 J.
COMM. 211, 213 (1967), "evaluative," Morris B. Holbrook, Beyond Attitude Structure: To-
ward the Informational Determinants of Attitude, 15 J. MARKETING 545, 545 (1978), "social-
psychological," Terence A. Shimp, Social Psychological (Mis)Representations in Television
Advertising, 13 J. CONSUMER AFFS. 28, 29-31 (1979), "social reality," Richard W. Mizerski
& Robert B. Settle, The Influence of Social Character on Preference for Social Versus Ob-
jective Information in Advertising, 16 J. MARKETING RES, 552, 552 (1979) and "feeling,"
Linda L. Golden & Keren A. Johnson, The Impact of Sensory Preference and Thinking
Versus Feeling Appeals in Advertising Effectiveness, 10 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 203,
203 (1983).
285. 1 have used this terminology in the past while discussing the application of this
distinction to deceptive advertising. For a further discussion on the factual versus evalua-
tive terminology and their distinctions among behavioral researchers see JEF. I. RICHARDS,
DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING: BEHAVIORAL STUDY OF A LEGAL CONCEPT 48-52 (1990).
286. Id. at 51.
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bute. For example, some consumers probably will feel "sexy" after using
a given cologne, whereas others will not.
Most ads provide little factual information 287 because consumers sel-
dom have the motivation to suffer through a long list of a product's intrin-
sic features and benefits. 288  In some cases there is minimal factual
information because there is little of value that one can say about the
product being promoted. After all, how much can one say about tobacco
stuffed in a paper tube (It Tastes Good!)? One could, of course, mention
the cultivation and processing of the tobacco, but who would want to read
it? The same problem is inherent in many products, like cologne (It
smells good), laundry detergent (It cleans well), toilet paper (It's soft).
For such products, the message is necessarily simple. Evaluative informa-
tion is common in advertising because it is used to create distinctive
brand identities. It also makes an otherwise boring message, such as "it
tastes good," more interesting and more likely to attract a consumer's
attention.
But what is important to recognize is that most communication in-
volves evaluative information. Suppose I look at an abstract painting and
say that "to me this is a statement about freedom in our society." I am
drawing my own evaluation of meaning. Certainly, freedom is not an in-
trinsic attribute of that painting. As children our parents told us, "this is
bad," or "this is how you succeed in life," but most of what we learn
about such things is through evaluation of the behavior of others. This,
too, is evaluative information. If one chooses to wear certain clothes, and
287. See, e.g., Richard W. Pollay et al., Regulation Hasn't Changed TV Ads Much!,
JOURNALISM Q., Spring 1980, at 438, 445; Alan Resnick & Bruce L. Stern, An Analysis of
Information Content in Television Advertising, J. MARKETING, Jan. 1977, at 50, 50-53.
288. This is called product involvement. Only when consumers consider a product rela-
tively important will they take the time to read or digest more than a few pieces of factual
information. See Meryl P. Gardner et al., Low Involvement Strategies for Processing Ad-
vertisements, 14 J. ADVERTISING 4, 5-6 (1985) (discussing varying levels of consumer in-
volvement in advertisement processing); Robert E. Smith & William R. Swinyard,
Information Response Models: An Integrated Approach, J. MARKETING, Winter 1982, at
81, 85. Professor Rodney Smolla points out that not all advertising is of the image variety,
remarking that "Old-fashioned product-information advertising, for example, has not gone
entirely out of fashion. The advertisements for 'new technology' equipment, such as per-
sonal computers, fax machines, or stereo components, are heavily product-information ori-
ented." Smolla, supra note 210, at 789-99 (footnotes omitted). Professor Smolla's
examples are products that typically are considered high involvement. Their expense moti-
vates most consumers to desire, and therefore digest, more facts about these products com-
pared with low involvement products, such as dish detergent, chewing gum, and of course,
cigarettes. This distinction between high and low involvement products is fundamental to
effective commercial advertising. Unfortunately, Professor Lowenstein and some other
critics of modern advertising seem to misunderstand this principle, and hence, the motives
behind "noninformational" advertising.
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a particular haircut, to convey a preferred image or style to others, one is
engaged in the kind of evaluative communication cigarette advertisers
use.
Stated differently, what Professor Lowenstein and others find so un-
palatable is, in reality, the art of advertising.28 9 Surely they do not intend
to suggest that artistic expression is undeserving of constitutional protec-
tion.29° This same art is applied to political advertising, which is fully
protected speech.291
Consequently, if we accept Professor Lowenstein's argument that such
noninformation falls outside the meaning of the First Amendment, then
we effectively abolish the protections afforded most expression.292 In-
289. Advertising has always used the work of artists, but in recent years, advertising
itself is being appreciated as an art form. See, e.g., Paul Goldberger, Signs of Lost Times:
Age Gives a Faded Glory to Old Advertisements Painted on the Sides of Buildings, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 1994, at 23 (noting how long standing signs on an apartment building have
become "artifacts"); Andrew Lecky, Prices Off the Wall for Vintage Posters, CHI. TRIB.,
May 14, 1992, § 3, at 3 (noting increased monetary value of advertising posters); Melissa
Morrison, Line Between Art and Ads Blurring, GAZETrE (Montreal), Nov. 30, 1991, at J5
(noting the distinction between art and advertisement is diminishing).
290. To the contrary, the Court has declared that the "First Amendment protects works
which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, regard-
less of whether the government or a majority of the people approve of the ideas these
works represent." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973) (emphasis added).
291. For an explanation of how emotive political commercials contribute to logic in
political dialogue, see generally ELIZABETH M.B.G. HUGHES, THE LOGICAL CHOICE: How
POLITICAL COMMERCIALS USE LOGIC To WIN VOTES (1994). One of the major criticisms
of political advertising is that it relies too heavily on imagery. See Gene R. Laczniak &
Clarke L. Caywood, The Case For and Against Televised Political Advertising: Implications
for Research and Public Policy, 6 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 16, 19-20 (1987). In fact,
another author used Professor Lowenstein's argument regarding noninformative tobacco
advertising to argue for the regulation of political advertising:
[C]ampaign speech has never been distinguished for its intellectual cogency or
analytic rigor. But, even granting that much political rhetoric is relatively mean-
ingless anyway, the fact remains that television ads that rely primarily on imagery
and 'mood advertising' have a unique potential for being absolutely
uninformative....
The fact that so many political ads do not even purport to convey information
assumes greater importance in light of the recognition that, in many races, televi-
sion commercials do not so much supplement the contest as define it.
Jack Winsboro, Comment, Misrepresentation in Political Advertising: The Role of Legal
Sanctions, 36 EMORY L.J. 853, 909-11 (1987) (emphasis in original).
292. In comparing commercial speech to core speech, Professor Smolla makes essen-
tially the same point, stating, "Vast quantities of the speech in the modern American mar-
ketplace consist of symbol, image, and fantasy .... Similarly, a great deal of our political
discourse is vacuous and fantastical. Politics is now often reduced to slogan and sound
bite." Smolla, supra note 210, at 793. Elsewhere, Professor Smolla recounts the Court's
consistent defense of emotional content in other forms of expression, stating, "Speech does
not forfeit the protection that it would otherwise enjoy merely because it is laced with
passion or vulgarity. The emotion principle is one of the cardinal tenets of modern First
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deed, the Supreme Court also has recognized that many forms of expres-
sion can have both cognitive and emotive impact worthy of protection:
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative func-
tion: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, de-
tached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well.
In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as
their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Con-
stitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual
speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which,
practically speaking, may often be the more important element
of the overall message sought to be communicated.293
Therefore, contrary to the opinions of those who attempt to minimize the
worth of advertising images, so-called noninformational appeals like
those found in cigarette ads are not only speech; they also are constitu-
tionally valuable speech. 94 Ironically, one reason modem cigarette ads
are predominantly image oriented is that, over the years, their factual
claims have been so heavily regulated.295
Some anti-smoking advocates undoubtedly believe the contribution of
a cigarette ad's message, such as images promising to make the smoker
slimmer or sexier, to the exposition of ideas is negligible because it is
Amendment jurisprudence. Without that tenet, much of the First Amendment as we know
it would unravel." RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 46 (1992).
293. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). A few years later, Justice Brennan
added his thoughts regarding emotive value:
A given word may have a unique capacity to capsule an idea, evoke an emotion,
or conjure up an image. Indeed, for those of us who place an appropriately high
value on our cherished First Amendment rights, the word 'censor' is such a
word.... Moreover, even if an alternative phrasing may communicate a speaker's
abstract ideas as effectively as those words he is forbidden to use, it is doubtful
that the sterilized message will convey the emotion that is an essential part of so
many communications.
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 773 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
294. Professor Smolla has noted: .
The baggage carried by commercial speech is the bias of the intelligentsia....
To the intellectual or the academic, speech that is rational, analytic, and con-
templative will usually receive higher marks than speech that appeals to passion
and prejudice .... But when the passion is attached only to a product ... the
academic is likely to be intolerant....
This judgement, however, itself reflects a bias that is undemocratic and intellec-
tually elitist.
Smolla, supra note 210, at 783.
295. John E. Calfee, Cigarette Advertising Regulation Today: Unintended Consequences
and Missed Opportunities, 14 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 264, 264-65 (1987) (describ-
ing cigarette advertising regulation's potential harm to smokers).
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false. On the contrary, it is not false.2 96 Some smokers probably do ex-
perience the benefits cigarette ads extol. Indeed, in some groups smoking
does promote popularity, and some people are able to curtail their appe-
tite to attain a slimmer physique by smoking. This is a classic example of
opinion statements. If the First Amendment protects anything, it is the
right to express an opinion.297 Regulation may not be used to keep citi-
zens ignorant of that opinion, even if it is feared that they might make
bad decisions as a result of hearing it.298
Cigarette ads also transmit a more clearly political message. Barry
Lynn of the American Civil Liberties Union noted that people who
choose to smoke have a "right to learn through advertisements that
others support their decisions., 299 The mere existence of these ads now
represents a message of rebellion against the anti-smoking forces. It
296. Regarding image advertising, David McGowan correctly concludes that "[s]uch
advertising conveys ideas that ... are not susceptible of government determinations of
falsity." McGowan, supra note 65, at 444-45.
297. Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the con-
science of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
More recently, an appeals court interpreted that declaration, stating that "Gertz's im-
plicit command thus imposes upon both state and federal courts the duty as a matter of
constitutional adjudication to distinguish facts from opinions in order to provide opinions
with the requisite, absolute First Amendment protection." Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970,
975 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
298. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, Justice Blackmun, stated that the government's
argument in favor of prohibiting attorney advertising "assumes that the public is not so-
phisticated enough to realize the limitations of advertising, and that the public is better
kept in ignorance than trusted with correct but incomplete information .... In any event,
we view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance."
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 374-75 (1977). In Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, when the Court was confronted with a similar
prohibition on advertising prescription drug prices, the Court declared:
It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information,
and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment
makes for us. Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it wishes
of its pharmacists.... But it may not do so by keeping the public in ignorance of
the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering. In this sense,
the justifications Virginia has offered for suppressing the flow of prescription drug
price information, far from persuading us that the flow is not protected by the
First Amendment, have reinforced our view that it is.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976); see also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982) (holding that the First Amend-
ment protects fundamentally the free exchange of ideas with the public in the political
process); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 827 (1975).
299. Advertising of Tobacco Products: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 456,457 (1986)
(statement of Barry W. Lynn, legislative Counsel for American Civil Liberties Union).
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stands as a counterpoint to political correctness and a protest against gov-
ernment regulation. The political message implicit in cigarette advertis-
ing distinguishes it from normative commercial speech. To abolish
tobacco ads would substantially diminish the expression of that political
viewpoint, which is, of course, the intent.
Finally, one might argue that the current FDA plan to limit the use of
cigarette brand names on clothing or sponsorship of sporting events is
innocuous because no real message is being prohibited. However, it is
clear that one purpose for regulating tobacco promotions, particularly
when asserting the goal of protecting children, is to remove them from
public view so that smoking is not seen as normative behavior. There-
fore, even the brand name "Marlboro" on a t-shirt or the side of a race
car, with no other explicit message, is speech vital to countering the polit-
ical message that smoking is not normal or socially acceptable behavior.
Consequently, even the simplest tobacco promotion contains important
communicative value.
Tobacco ads and related promotions differ from other commercial
speech on several dimensions, and they definitely involve subject matter
of the highest public interest and concern. Although many will balk at
the idea of awarding such status to marketing communications of any
kind-let alone tobacco products-cigarette advertising appears to meet
the necessary conditions for protection as fully protected speech.
IV. CONCLUSION
The most direct and effective way to curtail smoking-related deaths is
to ban the sale of tobacco products. A ban, however, is the one option
that federal officials have yet to discuss openly. Undoubtedly, this results
from both the enormous political obstacles that would be encountered 30 0
and the likelihood that such a move would create a criminal market like
the one experienced during Prohibition. Consequently, a multitude of
alternative steps have been taken to diminish tobacco-related health
problems. These steps, however, can be interpreted in at least two differ-
ent ways.
The first interpretation places those actions in a very positive light:
To compensate for the inability to regulate tobacco sales,
other steps are necessary.
300. Professor Cass suggests that the "reason for suggesting restraints on advertising
cigarettes manifestly is rooted in realpolitik.... Those who believe that cigarette smoking
is harmful for the primary and secondary smoker also believe that, however desirable, a
ban on smoking is politically impractical." Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitu-
tionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1317, 1379 (1988).
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" Therefore, to protect the health of nonsmokers, government
officials have passed laws and regulations to prevent smoking
in many workplaces and public buildings.
" In addition, to provide the information that tobacco compa-
nies omit, officials are informing the public of the dangers in-
herent in smoking.
" Finally, to prevent tobacco companies from manipulating citi-
zens into adopting the smoking habit, officials are attempting
to regulate or ban tobacco advertising.
Undoubtedly, this is an accurate interpretation of events. From this per-
spective it may be difficult to perceive the actions of officials as political
or controversial in nature. Those goals are clearly laudable and in the
interest of the public welfare.
If one focuses on the effects of those actions rather than the goals, it is
possible to develop a somewhat less positive viewpoint:
" Instead of controlling the harmful substance, government offi-
cials are attempting to control consumers.
" Accordingly, government officials are progressively eliminat-
ing places where people can smoke.
" In addition, government officials are engaged in a persuasive
campaign, using their positions of influence to turn the tide of
public opinion against smoking and smokers.
" Finally, government officials are trying to eliminate pro-smok-
ing messages or at least make them impotent, thereby keeping
people ignorant about a legal product.
This alternate view, too, may be an accurate interpretation of the facts,
but it highlights the potential incompatibility of these actions with our
democratic ideals, because it smacks of behavior control, paternalism,
and the stifling of free choice. Even if one admits to the inherent dangers
of tobacco-and most do-it still is possible to interpret this situation as
an abuse of government authority.
While both viewpoints are legitimate, politically they are miles apart.
The commercial nature of this product is virtually irrelevant to a debate
between the two positions. It is a dispute about political methods, rather
than products. It is about the propriety of government controlling con-
sumers as a means of regulating the use of harmful substances, and ciga-
rette advertising is integral to that dialogue.
Over the past decade the Supreme Court has created an atmosphere
conducive to legislative limitations on tobacco advertising. Ironically,
those who have fought so diligently to eliminate tobacco advertising may
have opened the door to enhanced protections for that advertising by
turning it into political speech. Under this higher standard, cigarette ad-
1996] 1211
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vertising might still be regulated. However, any regulation would be
evaluated using the exacting scrutiny30 1 reserved for speech at the top of
the First Amendment hierarchy, making it much less likely that the law
will be deemed constitutional.
This is not intended to suggest that the Supreme Court will adopt a
political speech approach. To date, the Court has been unwilling to ac-
cord such status to commercial messages. While the political nature of
cigarette advertising makes it quite unlike other commercial messages,
individual Justices undoubtedly would find it difficult to reconcile any
policy that grants more protection to tobacco ads than to ads for baseball
and apple pie. As Justice Blackmun noted recently, "[t]he simple reality
is that the Court will never provide child pornography or cigarette adver-
tising the level of protection customarily granted political speech. ''312
Tobacco manufacturers have not yet argued the political nature of ciga-
rette advertising, and there is no doubt that it is controversial. However,
it is viable in light of previous decisions and the Court should not dismiss
it easily. It highlights the difficulty inherent in delineating a hierarchy of
First Amendment values. Most commercial speech, like most other forms
of speech, is fairly mundane and plays no significant role in public debate.
But, as with other speech, there are times when commercial messages can
take center stage in a critical social dialogue. The Court has yet to fully
explicate a basis for treating commercial speech as a second class form of
expression under the Constitution. For twenty years the Court has relied
upon common sense, rather than fact or ideological principles, as its sole
basis for according commercial speech limited protection. It is time for
the Court either to provide a principled distinction, or abolish that dis-
tinction altogether.
301. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976) (discussing political association as
protected by the First Amendment).
302. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 445 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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